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2 Executive Summary 
The study, which is part of a research project on the prospects .for public finances in the 
· EU Member States, aims at providing  .estil~ates of  the budgetary effects of  demographic 
changes  in  EU  Member  States  over  the  coming  decades· and  at  developing  a 
· methodological framework for monitoring budgetary trends· in Member States over the 
medium and long-term  . 
.  The study integ).'ates the results of  the most recent pension expenditure projections carried .. 
out by national authorities with estimates of the effects of drniographic changes on the. 
other main. age.,.related  expenditure  items  (such  as  health  care,  education  and  family 
allowances) to provide tentative estimates of  the. changes in the ratio of public primary 
expenditure to GDP under C<:>nstant policies in six EU Member States over the period up  . 
to the year 2030.  · 
An indicative measure ofthe primary balance trend, derived from the expenditure trends, . 
is then used to evaluate the adjustments required on the primary balance over the .Period 
1998-2030 to implement the "close-to-bi:tlance" rule indicated in the Stability and Growth 
Pact 
Several  aspects  of the  project  need  substantial  refmement  and  improvement.  The  . 
estiinate~ included in the note therefore 'indicate only the broad direction of  the impact of 
demographic  change  and  the  broad  dimension· of ·required  policy  adjustment.  ~orne 
general results are, however, rather clear. 
Under  constant  policies,  in  most  of the  countries  considered  the  ratio  of public 
expenditure to GDP _is  likely to increase substantially. The effects of ageing on pension 
and health expenditure, in spite of  J;ecent reforms, would not be offset by' the reduction in 
the demand for the public services and transfers directed to young citizens. 
This implies that present' primary surpluses would be gradually eroded by  expendi~e 
increases  and that,  if present  expenditure  policies  are  continued,  in  most  countries 
. population ageing will result in the long-run either in greater deficits and debts or in large 
increases in tax rates. ·  . 
In most countries, .  the ·implementation of the "close-to-balance" rule  indicated  in the 
Stability  and  Growth  Pact  wo~ld require  substantiru  changes  to  present  budg~tary 
policies.  The  achievement  of a  balanced  budget  over  the  next  few  years  would 
nevertheless allow Member States to  meet the worsening of the demographic situation 
after the year 2010  (when the  baby-boom generation will retire) with smaller public 
debts. The ensuing reduction in interest payments would allow Member States to  offset 
part of  the likely increases in pension and health expenditure. 
The "close-to-balance" rule  would. force  governments  to  m~e  use  of the  "breathing-
space" available over the next decade to meet the ageing of the "baby-boom" generation 
on a sounder fiscal policy footing. This would reduce the total adjustment required on the 
primary balance. · ·  1. Introduction• 
·_  Changes in birth rates, life expectancy and migration flows are modifying the level and . 
structure of  the population of European Union Member States. The increase in the old-
age dependency ratio, which is reaching historically unprecedented levels, 'is one of  the 
most evident and· important trends~  •  .  In the coming decades, demographic changes will · 
produce pervasive ·effects on labour and  c~pitai·markets,· goods  ~d  services  markets~ 
macroeconomic aggregates and relative prices.  2 · They will also  affect public budgets, 
through their effects  on the deman.d  for  public  services and  transfers and,  indirectly,_· 
through their. effects on the above-mentioned yconomic factors. 
·  · Significant pressures towards higher public expenditure are expected in the pension and 
health sectors.  On the  other hand,  the decline  in· the -share  of young peopie  in total" 
population tends to reduce the demand for :public services and transfers in other areas, 
.namely  education,  maternity  and  child· allowances.  Overall,. there  is .a  widespread 
consensus that demographic changes tend to· increase public expenditure -and  produce· 
negative  ~ffects on public budgets.J  These pressures,  unless offset by policy changes, 
might endanger the fiscal frameworlc designed in the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability 
and Growth Pact. 
Both at national  and  EU level,  studies  are  needed  to  evaluate, well in itdvance,  the 
budgetary  effects of these  demographic  changes.  At national level,  such  evaluations · 
should guide the adjustment of  expenditUre programs to the new demographic conditions. 
At Union level, systematic evaluati()ns of  the medium and long-term prospects ofpublic 
budgets would contribute to signal trends potentially undermining the rules introduced 
for.deficits and,.debts. This is particularly relevant since budgetary pressures arising from 
demographic changes will vary. very much across the EU according to different national 
demographic trends and public expenditure .structures.  More specifically, indicators of 
medium- and. long-term trends  in public budgets  could provide a .  framework  for  the 
ass~ssment of  the Stability and Convergence Programs. 
Objectives - The study, which is part of a research project on the prospects for public 
~ances  in the EU Member S~tes, has two objectives:  ·  ·  ' 
a) 
b) 
• 
2 
3 
. to  provide some preliminary estimates of the budgetary  effects of demographic 
changes in some EU Member States over the coming decades; 
to . develop  a  methodological  framework  for  monitoring  budgetary  trends  in 
Member States over the medium and long-term. · 
The views expressed in this paper represent exclusively the positions of the authors and do not necessarily 
correspond to those. of  the European Commission. The authors would like to thank M. Jones, ... , for valuable 
comments and suggestions and C. John, R.  Vanrie and J.  Walliser for having made available unpublished age-
related expenditure profiles. 
See European Commission (1995, 1996) and OECD (1988a). 
See European Commission (1994), Borsch-Supan (1991), Hagemann and Nicoletti (1989) .. 
See Heller et at.  ( 1986), OECD ( 1988a) and Leibfritz eta/. ( 1995). 
5 . More specifically, as  to  the .first objective, the study provides  elePten~ to assess the · 
sustaimibility  of current  EU  Member  States'. fiscal  policies,. i.e  .. ~e. possibility  of 
maintaining .·  present  'expel).diture  and  revenue  policies . without  :excessive · debt 
accumulation, taking into account the impact of expected demographic changes, It  also 
estimates the adjustments required to ensure the implementation of  the "close-to.;;balance" . 
rule .outlined in the· Stability and Growth Pact. The problem of developing indicators. of 
. ,  long-term trenqs of  public budgets is approached with a view that 1 'a good indicator of 
stistainability  is  one' which  sends  clear and easily  interpretabl~ signals  when current 
policy appear to be leading to a rapidly growing debt to GDP  ratio~'  .4  ·  · 
Methodology - The first part of the stUdy considers alternative indicators of. long-term 
budgetary trends and examines -the characteristics and results of the .main international 
· studies which have  examin:~d long-term public expenditure 'prospects in recent years. 
Some projections carried out by public institUtions in EU Member States are also taken 
into consideration..  · 
The following parts of  the study provides some tentative estimates-of the changes in the 
ratio of public primary expenditure to GDP in some EU Member States over ihe period · 
up to the year 2030 by integrating:  .  ·  . 
(i)  the  results  of the  most  recent  penSion  expendittire  projections  carried  out  by 
.nation~ authorities (see the report on "Pension expenditure projections in Europe: 
A surVey of  national Projections"- European Economy, 1996, No.3),  · 
(ii)  mechanical estimates of  the effects of  demographic changes on the other main age-
r~lated expenditure items (such as health care,' education and family allowances).-
. At  present, these estlm.ates are provided for only six Member States for which data 
are available (Belgiw;n, Finland, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden). The estimates 
are produced. by combining data on per capita expenditures for different age-groups 
and for  different  budgetary  items,· expressed  in terms  of per capita  GDP,  with 
Eurostat's  new demographic  projections  for  the  period  1995-2050.  Age-related 
profiles  of public  expenditure  have  usually  been  obtained  from  generational 
accounting· studies. Alternative demographic scenarios are considered,· as well as  · 
alternative dynamics of  age-related per capita exp~nditure.  · 
I  '  . 
An indicative  measiu-e  of the  primary  balance  trend  is  then obtained by  addirig  the 
projected changes of  age-related public expenditure to the primary balance-level expected 
for  1997, assuming that revenues and age-unrelated expenditure ate constant in GDP 
terms at their present levels. The estimates for the primary balance are finally used to 
project the ratio of public debt to GDP on the basis of assumptions on interest rates and 
productivity growth. For an outline of  the projection procedure, ,see Chart below. 
The estimates for the primary balance are also used to evaluate the.adjustments required 
on the primary balance over the period 1997-2030 to achieve the "close-to-balarice" rule 
indicated in the Stability and Growth Pact. 
4  Blanchard et at. ( 1990, p. 8). 
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In order to have a concise and comparable measure of the adjustment required for each . · 
country, the study also estimates the "tax-gap" consistent with the implementation of  the 
"close-to-balance" rule outlined in the Stability and Growth Pact. (i.e. the change in the 
tax to GDP ratio immediately required in order to reach, by the end of the projection 
.  period, the debt to  GDP  ratio  that would be· reached  by  implementing the  "close-to-
balance" rule). The tax-gap concept allows a comparison of  the adj~stnients t:equired by 
the "close-to-balance" rule with those ·that would be required to keep the debt to GDP 
ratio by the end of the projection period at the present level (i.e, the "sustainable tax-
gap" a  Ia Blanchard). It  also allows comparisons of  alternative macroeconomic scenarios. 
Notes of  caution- The limitations of  this approach should be stressed. 
a)  National pension projections are taken at face  value; no attempt has been made to 
eval~ate the reliability of the projections presented in the preceding sections.  An 
indirect  indicator of the  reliability  of projections  is,  however,  provided  by  the 
7 adjustments implemented in projections over time.  The fact  that estimates  have 
been usually r~vised upwardss p1ay suggest,  that .there is tendency to underestimate . 
~xpenditure  trends.  Moreover,  the  eqonomic  and  demographic  assumptions 
underlying the national projections are nbt homogeneous and may also differ from 
those used for projecting non-pension expenditure items. 
b)  The  approach  used  for  projecting  non-pension  expenditure  items  is  purely 
me<?hanical  and takes only demographic factors  into  consideration. Demographic 
factors  actually  affect  public  budgets  through  several  more  complex  channels. 
: Moreover,  public  expenditure  and  revenue  dynamics  largely  depend  on  non-
demographic factors. Therefore, the estimates indicate only the broad direction of 
the  impact of  demographic  change  and the broad dimension· of  required policy 
adjustment. 
,· 
c)  Some estimates ofper·capita expenditures for different age-groups and for different. 
budgetary items· are still rather unsatisfactory (for instance, the expenditure profiles 
for  Spain consider only three large age-groups, those for Belgium refer to  1988 
data, education expenditure is not considered for Germany and Sweden). Therefore 
the results presented in this draft are-preliminary. 
d)  Some  assumptions  (e.g.,  productivity  growth,  interest  rates)  are  necessarily 
arbitrary.  Sensitivity  analysis ·is  carried  out  to  evaluate  the  implications  of 
alternative assumptions. 
e)  Present ratios of non age-related expenditure and revenue to GDP are assumed to 
remain  constant  over  time.  Some  e~penditure and  revenue  items  are  actually 
temporary (e.g., the expenditure related to German reunification and the one-off tax 
measures implemented by some governments). In order to evaluate the adjustment 
required  by  demographic  changes  under  unchanged  policies,  expenditure  and 
revenue ratios should be corrected for the most important of  these temporary items. 
f)  Labour force  participation rates and unemployment rates  are  at present assumed 
constant over the projection period, as well as age-related per capita expenditure for 
unemployment  benefits.  As  ·indicated  in  some  national  reports  on  long-term 
expenditure trends, unemployment rates and unemployment benefit expenditure are 
likely to decline. 
Structure  of the  paper  - The  paper .  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  presents 
alternative indicators of long-term budgetary trends and examines the characteristics and 
results  of  the  main  international  studies  which  have  examined  long-term  public 
expenditure  prospects  in recent  years.  Some  national  projections  are  also  taken  into 
consideration. Section 3 ·presents the methodology for the estimates of age-related public 
expenditure trends;. it also presents some estimates of the burden that these expenditures 
will  represent  for  the  working..:age  population.  Section 4,  drawing  from'  a  survey of 
national pension expenditure  projec~ions carried out within the European Commission, 
examines  expected  pension  expenditure  trends.  Section  5  provides  some  tentative 
estimates of the ratio of age-related public expenditure to  GDP  by  integrating national 
pension projections with the mechanical estimates of  the effects of demographic changes 
on the age-related expenditure items. It also estimates primary balance trends under the 
assumption that revenues and age-unrelated expenditure remain constant as  a  share of 
5  See Franco and Munzi ( 1996). 
8 GOP.  Fi1.1.ally, j{  provides estimates of the adjustments required on the primaty balance 
over the  p~riod 1998-2030 to implement the  "close-to-balance" rule  indicated  in the. 
Stability anci".Orowth ·Pact. The implications of the exclusion of some expenditure and 
revenue items of  a temporary nature, as well as of  different interest rates and productivity 
growth rates are also·· considered.  Comparisons of different scenarios are  presented in 
terms of  tax-gaps. Section 6 outlines the main results .of the study and point to directions 
for further work. 
2. Indicators of  medium-and long-term trends in public budgets 
Since the mid-80s, when it became apparent that Western countries were experiencing · 
major changes ·in their  demographic  structure,  an  increasing  number of studies  have 
examined the long-terin prospects of public budgets. The studies were prompted by the 
widespread  perception that population ageing  was  going  to  increase  the  demand  for 
public expenditure and produce negative effects ~m  public budgets. 
Two  lines  of research  have  been ·followed:  one  group  of studies  has  evaluated  the 
prospects of  the main age-related expenditure programs and has produced projections of 
the ratio of  age-related expenditure to GDP; projections ofthe primary balances have also 
be~n derived assuming age-unrelated expenditures and revenues. to remain constant as a 
percentage of GDP.6  Another group has  taken all  budgetary items. into  account. in the 
. Generational. Accounting framework developed by Auerbach and Kotlikoff.  7 These two 
lines of  research are examined in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 respectively. 
2.1 Projections of  age-:-related public expenditure 
The studies examining the prospects of  age-related expenditure programs focus  on the 
items of public expenditure which ·are particularly dependent on the age structure of the 
population  (such  as  pension,  health,  education).  They  combine  data  on  per  capita 
expenditures for different age-groups and for different budgetary items with demographic 
projections. Some studies consider only the effects of  demographic changes, while others 
also try to capture some non-demographic factors such as pension scheme maturation and 
long-term trends towards higher health expenditure. Some studies go further and develop 
projections for the primary balance and estimates of the adjustments required to ensure 
budgetary sustainability.  · 
2.1.1 Mechanical projections of the effects of demographic changes - The most basic 
approach provides estimates of  the effects of demographic changes on public expenditure 
under the assumption that age-related per capita expenditure  levels remain constant in 
real terms or in per capita GDP terms on the initial level over the projection period. In 
other words, it is assumed that present standards of  transfers and s.ervices are maintained 
for all population age-groups and that there is no behavioural response from governments 
and households to demographic changes and their 'budgetary effects. 
6 
7 
Leibfritz eta/. (1995), Roseveare eta/. (1996) and  OECD (1996) are among the most recent studies on the 
issue. 
See Auerbach et al.  ( 1991,  1994) and Kotlikoff ( 1992). 
9 : _S,'ome_  mechanical  projections  aimed  at  evaluating  the  pure  impact ·of demographic 
·  'chahges were carried out by OECD in 1988  for  i2 countries (see OECD,  1988a). The 
burden for the financing of the main social prograrmnes per working-age citizen was 
projected up to the.year 2040 (see Box 1) ..  Demographic pressure on pension and health 
expenditure was expected to be very large in all  the countries considered. Education and 
family  benefits,  which  are  m~stly related  to  younger  age-classes,  were  expected  to 
decrease in all  countries,  but not enough to  offset the increase in pension and health 
expenditure.  Over the  period  1980-2040  the  burden  would  grow  by  54  per cent  in 
Germany, 39 per cent in Italy and the Netherlands, 32 per cent in France, 20 to 26 p.er 
cent in Belgium, Sweden and Denmark and 11  per cent in the UK (Table 1). At the end 
of  the period, the ratio ofsocial expenditure to GDP would be In the 37-:-49 per cent range 
in all the above-mentioned countries (Table 2), with the only exception of  the UK. (24 per 
cent). The pressure of  ageing on social expenditure was expected to increase substantially 
from  2010  onwards,  when  the  "baby  b.oom"  generation  reaches  retirement  age.  A 
breathing space would therefore be available. for taking corrective action. 
However, it should. be  str~ssed that estimates combining data on per capita expenditures 
for different age-groups and for different budgetary items with demographic projections. 
are. only  indicative  measures  of the  likely  effects  of demographic.· change  on public 
expenditure,  since they do  not take  all  relevant  effects of demographic  changes  into 
accounts· 
a)  Mechanical estimates are based on the implicit assumption that the margj.nal cost of 
providing services to a smaller or a larger number of  individuals in each.age group 
in the future will be equal to the present average cost of these services.  9 In other 
words, it is  assumed that there are no economies or diseconomies of scale in the 
production of  public services. This assumption is surely implausible over relatively 
short  periods,  because  of time-lags . in  the  adjustment  of inputs  to  changes  in 
demand for public services. 
b)  Mechanical estimates implicitly assume that demographic changes do not. modify 
present age-related per capita expenditure  levels,  while  they  can  actually affect 
them through many  different, channels.  Demographic  changes  can influence the 
cost of inputs  used  in services  (e.g.,  a relative shortage of young  workers  may 
increase the cost of public services employing them)lO  and the demand for some 
services (e.g., the reduction in the number of  children may increase the demand for 
elderly care). They can also affect productivity tr~nds; wage rates and saving ratios. 
Economies/diseconomies of scale and the effects of  demographic changes on the level of 
age-related  per capita expenditure  are  not usually  taken  into  account  in  expenditure 
projections.  While  the  failure  to  consider economies  and  diseconomies  of scale  may 
compromise short period estimates, that concerning system-wide effects may affect long 
period estimates. 
8  This point is made in OECD (l988a), pp. 27-28. 
9  See also the several criticisms expressed in Pearson et a!.  ( 1989). 
10  This point is stressed in Pearson eta!. (1989). 
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 Moreover,· it should be stressed that demographic. change is just one of  the s~veral factors 
affecting public expenditure dynamics. The contribution of mechanical estimates of the 
effects of  demographic changes· to the as~essment of  the prospects for public expenditure 
is therefore necessarily li~ited. 
· Box1 
Main international projections of age-related public.  expenditure 
At the inte.rnationallevel, two major studies were carried out by IMFand OECD in the second part 
of the 1980s; a third was carried out by OEGD in  1995 and updated in  1996. By combining data 
on  per  capita  expenditure  for  each .. age-group  within  the  various ·social  programmes  with 
demographic projections,  OECD  (1988a)  evaluate9  the  pure  impact of demographic  changes 
while the IMF study (Heller eta/., 1986) and the second OECD study (Leibfritz eta/., 1995 and 
Roseveare et  a/.,  1996) also considered some additional factors influencing pension and health 
expenditure.  Both the earlier studies covered the.'five major social  programs:  education,  health  . 
care,  pensio~s  (oid-age,  survivors and  invalidity),  t:Jnemployment.  compensation  ·and· family 
benefits. OE:CD (1996) also projected total public expenditure~ OECD covered 12 countries in the 
first study and 20 in the second; IMF considered only the seven major Western countries. 
OECD  (1988a)  baseline  population  projections  were  based  on  the  assumption  of (a)  gradual 
convergence of fertility rates to replacement level, (b) an increase in life expectancy of 2 years for 
each sex between 1983 and 2030, (c) zero or low levels of net migration.  I~F's  baseline scenario 
was  s9mewhat  similar:  (a)  gradual  increase  in  total  fertility-ratio  that  by  2010  .reaches  the 
replacement level in five out of the seven countries, (b) increase in Jife expectancy at birth of 3.4 
years  for males  and  2.5 for females  between  1980  and  2010,  (c)  limited  net emigration  from 
Germany  and·  immigration  to  Canada  and  the  .  United  States.  Jwo  more  scenarios  were 
considered in the IMF paper. They both envisage a "Greater Ageing" situation with fertility broadly 
constant af 1980 levels-and with a life expectancy increase of 6.7 years for males and 4.8 years 
for females.  One scenario shares the baseline economic assumptions,  while the  other takes a 
more pessimistic view of growth and employment In OECD (1988a), the share of the elderly (65 
and over) in total population for the whole OECD was projected to rise from 12;2 p~r cent in  1980 
to 15.4 per cent in .2010 and 22.1  in 2040. For the seven major countries it  was· projected to rise 
from 12.5 per cent in 1980 to 16.4 and 22.8.per cent respeCtively~ The share of the elderly on the 
working age population was expected to grow at a faster rate.  In the IMF projections the ageing 
process  was  slower;·  in  the  seven  countries  the  share  of population  aged  65  and  over was 
projected to rise from 12.5 per cen_t in  1980 to 15.9 in 2010 and  19.5 in 2025 (respectively 17.3 
and 22.3 per cent in the Greater Ageing scenario).  . 
OECD (  1988a) follows a two-step approach:  first it estimates the change in  expenditure in. real 
terms implied by p_rojected demographic changes (i.e., 'what would be the expenditure level in the 
base year under different demographic conditions, all other factors being equal); then it takes into 
consideration  the  capacity  to  finance  public  expenditure  by  dividing  the  index  of  projected 
expenditure levels by the index of the number of working-age citizens (15-64 age group). 
IMF (Heller et a/.,  1986) projections of pension and health expenditure also considers some non-
demographic factors. The growth in  the number of pensioners and the dynamics of the average 
pension  are  projected  taking  the  maturity  of the  different  systems  into  consideration.  More 
specifically,  the  average  pension  was  expected  to  grow  faster  than  implied  by  indexation 
arrangements  for  Italy,  Japan  and  the  United  Kingdom.  As  to  health  expenditure,  the  study 
outlines a baseline scenario in which average medical costs increase in line with productivity and 
an alternative scenario, more closely corresponding with historical experience, in which they grow 
by 0.3 to 0.9 percentage points per year faster than productivity'. 
In  the new projections produced within OECD  in  1996 (see Roseveare eta/., 1996 and  OECD, 
1996, that extend the results of Leibfritz eta/., 1995}, the  impact of population ageing on  public 
pensions,  public health  expenditure  and  the  overall  budget  position  were  examined· under the 
assumption of constant expenditure and revenue policies. As to pension expenditure, a simulation 
model was developed for each .countr)r taking legislated reforms into account.  Despite the efforts 
11 to capture  the  institutional arr.angements,  simplifying  assumptions were _necessary.  Projections 
were carried out for a baseline and four altenative scenarios. Two alternative· approaches were . 
taken·  for  health  expenditure  projections.  In  the  first,  expenditure  trends  were  estimated  by 
multiplying  present per capita  public health  expenditure  levels  .. by  the. total  number of elderly  ', 
people;  in the second,  they were estimated by  multiplying per capita .  health· expenditure by .the 
number -of  deaths  among  the . elderly  population.  The . latter  approach  is  based  on  the 
consideration that consumption of health care is concentrated in the period· preceding death, so  .· 
that .increases  in  life  expectancy  determine  an  increase ·  in  the  healthy  portion  of life.  Three 
alternative assumptions on the growth of per capita health expendi.ture were considered for each 
approach (with expenditure growing· at' the same rate of real GOP,  1 per cent slowe~ and  1 per 
cent faster).  In  order .to  estimate-the ·effects of ageing  on  the overall fiscal  position,  the other 
expenditure items· and public revenues  were assumed  to  remain  constant as  a percentage of 
· GOP. ·In Leibfritz eta/. (1995) specific projections were also carried out for education expenditure; 
spending per pupil was as.sumed 'to grow in line with productivity growth. 
2.1.2  Projections  considering  non-demographic  factors  - In  order  to  take  non-
demographic factors  into  consideration,  it .is  necessary .to  remove the. assumption that 
. age-related per capita expenditure levels remain constant in real terms or in per capita 
GDP  terms on the initial_level over the projection period.  This·· implies assuming that 
standards of  transfers and services will change over time. 
While several economic, political and social factors can obviously affect the dynamics of 
per  capita transfers  and  services,  the  studies  examining  the  prospects  of age-related 
expenditure usually  focus  only on tw:o  rather  specific ·factors:  the  effects -of changes 
introduced in legislation, but not yet embodied in present expenditure profiles, .  and the 
continuation of structural· e_xpenditure_ trends. These two factors are considered because 
they are consistent with a constant policy approach, while there is usually no attempt to 
predict the effects of  changes in behaviours and policies. 
The  effects  of .  changes ·introduced  in  legislation, .  but  not  yet  embodied  in  present 
expenditure profiles, are particularly relevant for pension expenditure projections. Since 
pension eligibility and transfer ratios  I I' can change considerab~y over tirrie because of  the 
maturation of  schemes, i.e. the process of  adjustment of  all pensions to present retirement 
rules.l2 On the one hand, pension coverage extensions and benefit improvements usually 
produce their full effe_cts oil the two ratios after many decades. On the other, quite often 
pension benefit curtailing reforms are implemented gradually and only dispiay their full 
effects  a  long  tiqte  later.l3  Therefore,  the  assumption  that  age-related  per  capita 
expenditure levels remain constant is not equivalent to a constant policy assumption. It 
implies that all the effects of changes introduced ·in legislation are reflected in present 
age-related per capita expenditure levels~ 
The continuation of structural expenditure trends  (i.e.,  the  assumption that some non-
demographic factors relevant in the past would continue to affect expenditure dynamics 
in the  future)  is  especially relevant. for  health care expenditure projections.  In several 
countries the health sector has  recorded for  long  periods a price deflator substantially 
11  For a definition of  eligibility and transfer ratios, see Section 4. 
12  The maturation of  pension schemes is examined in Franco and Munzi ( 1996). 
13  See OECD {l988b)  ... 
12 / 
. higher than the ODP deflator and a tendency towards a continuous: increase in per capita 
cons~ption.I4  _  ·.·.  ;,: 
·Projections integrating the mechanical effects of  demographi¢:·changes with estimates of 
some additional factors influencing pension and health expenditure ·were pr~duced  by the 
IMF in 1986 for the seven main Western econoinies (see Box 1).15  The growth in the 
number of  pensioners and the dynamics of  the average pension w~re  projected· taking the 
maturity of the different systems into• consideration. As to -health expenditure, ·the study 
outlined a scenario  in  which ·average  medical  costs were  rising  more  rapidly  than 
productivity. For France and Germany IMF's estimates for total social expenditure were 
similar to those of OECD (1988a). The IMF projected larger, increases than_ OECD for 
Italy; Japan and the United Kingdom and more limited increases for the United States 
·  .. (Table 2).16 
. New  projections  were  produced  by  OECD  in  1995  for  the  seven  major  Western 
e~ono~ies; they were updated_ and extended·to 20 countries in the following year (see  , 
. Box.  1).17  Pensio.n  expenditure  was  projected ·up. to  the  year  2070  taking  present 
. expenditure levels and the expected effects of major legislated changes in pension rules 
into  account.  Health-care projections were  carried out tip  to  the  year 2030 under six 
alternative scenarios. Contrary to previous projections, the·ratio of  education expenditure 
to GDP was assumed to-remain constant. 
In OECD's recent_projections, under the baseline scenario, over the period 2000-2030 in 
most  countries  the  increase · in pension  expenditure  would  range  between  4  and  6 
percentage points of GDP; the only exceptions would be Ireland, the United Kingdom 
and the United States with lower increases, and Finland and Italy with an increase of 
about  8  points  of GDP  (see  Table  3).  Health  expenditure  would  also  increase 
substantially, with most of the countries in the 1 to 3 per cent bracket (Ireland· and the 
United  Kingdom would  record  lower  increases).  The  burden  for  pension .and  health. 
expenditure would increase mostly in the period 2015-2030. 
Growing awareness for population ageing has also led to  a  substantial· increase in the 
resources  devoted  to.  national  long-term.  public.  expenditure  projections.  I&  Most 
projections consider only one expenditure sector, with pensions, health, education being 
the most frequently considered. The projections for pension expenditure are. examined 
more extensively in Section 4.  Projections for all the main public expenditure items are 
14 
15 
16 
OECD (1993) decomposed nominal health care expenditure growth over the period 1980-1990 for the OECD 
area (11.8 per cent per year) into the effects of general inflation (8  per cent), medical specific inflation (0. 7 
per cent),  the  increase  in  volume of services  (2.9  per cent,  of which  2.~ per cent  was  attributed  to  the 
increase in per capita services and only 0.3 per cent was due to the ageing process.).· 
See Heller et a/. ( 1986). 
The difference in  the estimates for  the United States is  due to  the fact that,  while the IMF considered the 
effects of the pension reform introduced  in  the .early  eighties,  OECD (1988a)  assumed that  real  per capita 
social benefits by age within each programme remained fixed at their 1980 levels. 
17  ·  See Leib~ritz eta/. ( 1995), Roseveare eta/. ( 1996) and OECD ( 1996). 
18  Some long-term projections were carried out also  in  the  past.  The Beveridge Report in  1942  included, for 
instance, a 30 year estimate of  social expenditure in the UK.  · 
13 available for only some CQuntries. Four studies produced by Belgian, Danish, Finnish and 
Italian public institutions are examined in Box 2.!? The Belgian and Italian projections 
appear less pessimistic than those carried out by IMEand OECD..  .  . 
'j.  . 
Box2 
Nation~l projections of  ag~-related public expenditure 
The Belgian Bureau du Plan (Englert eta/., 1994} projected total pUblic exp_enditure up to the year 
2050  with  the  MALTESE  model  that  allows  ncm-demographic  factors  to  be  _taken  into 
consideration (i.e. the-macroeconomic framework,  socio-economi~  behaviour of agents and social 
policies};  The  projection  considers  the  main  age-related  items  (pensions,  health  care, 
unemployment benefits,  family  allowances,  other social transfers}  as  well  as the  remainder of 
public  expenditure.  According  to  the  most favourable  scenario  considered,  the  share  of total' 
public expenditure to GOP would increase from 41.6 per cent in 1990 to 45.4 P,er cent in 2030 and · 
then  decline to 43.8 pe(cent by  th_e  year .2050  (see table below}.  The  i~crease in  expenditure 
ratio ·would  depend  on  pensions  and  health  care,  since  expenditure  for  the  other  items  is 
expected to decline. 
. 
Belgium : Englert eta/. (1994) 
Social public expenditure  Other public expenditure 
Unemploy- Family  Other social  Public  Transfers  Other 
Year  Pensions  Health  ment  allowances  transfers  consumption  to firms  transfers  TOTAL 
1991  10.5  5.2  2.2  . 1.9  4.1  14.7  2.3  0.7  41.6 
2000  11.6  5.7  2.2  .1.6  3.9  14.5  2.1  0.9  42.5 
2030  15.7  7.4  0.6  1.0  3.3.  14.5  2.1  0.9'  45.4 
2050  14.7  7.6  . 0.5.  0.8  3.0  14.3  2.1  0.9  43.8 
/  Note: Favourable scenario assuming that private employment grows at 0. 75 p.a. and GOP at 2.35% p.a. 
The Danish Ministry of finance (1995) projected public expenditure on trartsfers and services to 
elderly and young  citiz~ns. The share of public expenditure to GOP  is expected to rise· from  18 
per cent in  1995 to  about 19.5 per cent  in  2005  and  to  more  than  24  per cent in  2030._  The 
increase  in  the  expenditure  for the  elderly  would. not  be  compensated  by  a  reduction  of ·the 
expenditure for young citizens, which would also increase, particularly over the period up to 2010. 
The assumptions underlying these projections imply that changes  in  the burden  for elderly and 
young_ citizens  reflect changes in  the. size of these population groups.  Sensitivity analysis was 
carried out to evaluate the effects of changes  in  unemployment rates,  average retirement age, 
productivity growth in public services and life expectancy.  · 
Denmark .. Ministry of Finance (1995) 
Public expenditure for young citizens  Public expenditure for old citizens  TOTAL 
1995  4.9  13.1  18 
2005  5.8  13.7  19.5 
2030  .  6.2  18.3  24.5 
I 
Note:  It is  assumed  that  the  unemployment  level  is  constant  from  1995  onwards,  that  the  ratio  of ·the  number of I 
.  employees in  services for the elderly to the number of elderly citizens is constant,  and that public wages and transfers 
are adjusted in line with private sector wage dynamics. 
19  For the United States see Shoven et al.  (1991), that consider expenditure programs representing about 40 per 
cent of  public expenditure and carry out projections for the period up to the year 2040. 
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The Finnish Ministry of Social Affairs and Health {1994) carried out social expenditure projections 
for  the  period · 19~0-2030 on .  the·  basis  of three  macroeconomic  scenarios.  In  the  baseline 
scenario, the share of social expenditure to· GOP  is expected to .increase ·from 27.2 per cent in 
1990 to 36.6 per cent by the year 2030 {see table below). Pension  expenditure~woul_d·increase 
from ··11.1· per cent of GOP in .1990 to 18.8 per 'Cent in 2030.  U~employnient bene.fit expenditure 
would increase substantially. over the first ·1 0 years of the projection  pe~od (from 1.2 per cent in 
1990 to 5.3 in ·1995 and 4.4 percent in 2000),.and later decline to a level close to the initial one. 
Finland- Ministry of  Soc.ial Affairs and Health (1996) 
Social. expenditure 
Unemployment  Social and 
Year  Pensions  Sickness insurance  benefits  health services  Other  TOTAL 
1990  ·11.1  3.5  1.2  10.~  1.2  27.2 
1995  14.9  4.0.  5.3  12.6  1.2  38.0 
2000  15.0  3.8  4.4  11.8  1.1  36.1. 
2050  18.8  3.5  1.4  12.1  0.8  36.6 
Note:  B~seline scenario: GOP growth= 2.7% from 1996 to 2000, 2% from 2000 to 2010, 1.9% from 2010 to 2020 and 
1.2% from 2020 to 2030. 
In  order to  evaluate  the  dynamics of the three  most important age-related expenditure  items 
{pensions,  health  and  education),  the  Italian  State  General  Accounting  Office (1996a,  1996b, 
1996c)  ·~arried  out  projections  based  on . different demographic  and  policy  scenarios.  In  the  · 
baseline scenario, the share of pension and health expenditure to GOP would increase over the 
period 1995-2045 respectively from 13.6 to 14.7 per cent and from 4.4 to 6.6 per cent {see table 
· below). Education expenditure would decline from 5.3 per cent to 4.2 per cent. Total expenditure 
for these three items would increase fro.m 23.3 per cent of GOP in ·1995 to 25.5 per cent in-2045. 
Italy-State General Accou.nting Office (1996) 
Social expenditure 
Year  Pensions  Health  Education  TOTAL 
1995  13.6  4.4  5.3  23.3 
2000  13.6  4.5  4.7  22.8 
2030  16.0  5.8  3.9  25.7. 
2045  14.7  . 6.6  4.2  25.5 
Note: Baseline demographic scenario developed by the General Accounting Office. Pension expenditure estimates refer 
to the·scenario including the effect of the 1995 reform and assuming the indexation of pensions to price dynamics and 
the adjustment of pension coefficients to changes in life expectancy. Health expenditure projections refer to the scenario 
assuming that expenditure per member of each age group increases as per worker productivity. Education expenditure 
estimates assume an increase ·;n school attendance rates, ·an  increase in the students/teachers ratio and wages in the 
education sector increasing in line with per worker productivity in the economy. 
These estimates were updated iri 1997 {see· state General Accounting Office, 1997) on the basis 
of the new demographic projections carried out by the Italian National Statistical office. The new 
estimates point to smaller increases in pension and health expenditure and to a smaller decline in 
education expenditure.  · 
2.1.3 Estimates of sustainable primary balances and tax-gaps - Projections of age-
related public expenditure can be used to produce estimates of  the changes to be expected 
in  the  primary  balance  under  the  assumption  that  revenues  and  age-unrelated 
expenditures remain constant as a percentage of GDP. Estimates of primary balances can 
then be used to assess the sustainability of current budgetary policies taking expected 
15 'oDP growth and the burden for  the  public debt into  consideration.  Blanchard (1990) 
introduced the concept oftai-gap,i.e. ,the gap between the current ~  to GDP level and 
the  sustainable tax to  GDP  level,  the  latter being  the  level. which, if  constant,  would 
·achieve  an unchanged  debt to  GDP  ratio  by the  end  of the  projection· penod given·  . 
.  expected expenditure trends (for a description of  the methodology used to compute the 
"tax~gap", see Annex A, that refers to Blanchard, 1990, and Blanchar~  eta!., 1990).20 
In a study carried out within OECD, Blanchard eta!. (1990)"estimated the long-term tax-
gap for  18 countries. over a 40 year horizon taking long.:.term  proj~ctions of pension and  · 
health  care  expenditure  into  account.  The  ratio  of pension  expend~ture to .  GDP  was 
assumed to  change in .line ·with demographic trends,2I  while  medical care expenditure 
was  assumed to  be  affected  by  changes  in population structure  and  increases in the 
relative .  price of medical .  care. 22 The study also  estimated the short- and medium-term . 
tax-gaps which are ·not affected by demographic changes: the former is computed on a 
one-year time horizon and  does  not require projections;  the  latter relies  on five  year 
·projections of economic activity  and  public spending. and considers  expected cyclical 
effects.  · 
Assuming that the difference between the interest rate and the growth rate is 2 per cent 
and relative medical· inflation is  1 per cent, the long-term tax-gap resulted positive (i.e., 
an increase in revenues wa.S required) in 5 out of  the 8 EU Member States. for which both 
pension  and  health  expenditure  trends  were  considered  (see  Table  4).  The  gap  was 
particularly high for Italy (6 points) and the Netherlands (4 points). For France, Sweden 
.  I 
and Germany it was  in the  1 to  2 per cent bracket. Negative gaps were estimated for 
Belgium, Denmark and the United Kingdom (i.e., revenues could have been reduced). 
For most coun~ies the medium-term gap was more favourable than either  t~e short- or 
long-term gap. The worsening between the medium- and the long-term gap was usually 
verylarge.  · 
Delbecque and Bogaert (1994) carried out a similar analysis for Belgium for the peripd 
up to 2050. In a first stage, on the basis of current budgetary data from national sources 
and assuming a nominal GDP growth of  5 per cent, they computed the required minimum 
·primary ·surplus, i.e.  the level of the primary surplus that could be maintained forever 
without giving rise to an explosion of the public debt. As a result, under the assumption 
·of a difference between the interest rate and the GDP growth rate of 2.5 per cent (which 
was considered the most realistic, given historical trends), the. Belgian primary surplus 
s~ould have  been maintened  constant  from· 1994  onwards  at a  level  of 4."2  per  cent 
percentage points of GDP (see Table 5). This would imply that Belgium, which then had 
a surplus of5.2 per cent ofGDP, was in·a sustainable position. 
20 
21 
22 
The tax-gap can  be split in  two  components:  the short-term  primary  gap  (i.e.,  the adjustment - positive or 
negative - required to stabilise the debt in the short- term) and the effects of  the changes in the primary balance 
(i.e., the adjustment required to offset the effects of  the changes expected in expenditures and revenues). 
More specifically, the expenditure to  GDP ratio was assumed to  change in  line with changes in  the old-age 
dependency ratio, which implies that the transfer and the eligibility ratio were assumed as constant. 
Three assumptions were considered, with relative price inflation of medical care equal to 0,  1 and 2 per cent 
per year. Projections of health care were not produced for 6 countries. 
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 · As a 'second stage of the analysis, Delbecque and Bogaert calculated the ·recommended · 
primary surplus, i.e. the level of  the ·prim~  surplus that W()1Jld gua:r~tee the long-terln 
sustainability of fiscal  policy~ g·iven  the  actual  pension·. ~xpeilditure projections.  This 
indicator was calculated on the basis oflong-term public finance projections carried out 
wi,thin  the  MALTESE ·  model.  23  ·The  recommended  primary  surplus  allows  pension 
expenditure increases to be·fully  .. offset ~y  a decline in interest payments caused by a fast 
reduction in the debt to GOP ratio.ln.this case~ under the same economic aSsumptions, 
the' sustainability would b~ assured only if  the levefof  the primary surp~us is  incre~ed  to. 
7.6 p~r  cent ofGDP by the year 1997. 
Underlying  the  mtntmum  surplus · and  the  recommended  surplus  there  ate  different 
approaches  to  the  expected increases  in pension  ~xpenditure. The  attainement of the 
· minimum .surplus. would imply a year by year compensation of the expenditure groWth 
with tax  increases  or expenditure  cuts;  the· attainement  of th~ recommended  surplus 
would  imply  a ·bigger  imp1ediate  effort  with  a  view  to  preserve  present  pension 
arrangements.  If reforms  were  introduced  to  curb  pension  expenditure  growth,  the 
recommended surplus would decline. 
The oyerall impact of ageing populations on government budget positions up to the year 
2030 was examined in the studies carried out by OECD in 1995-1996.24 For the period 
19'95-2000, the net primary balance was projected on the basis ofOECD's Medium Term 
Reference  Scenario.  For the  period  2000-2030,  long-term  projections  of the  primary · 
balance were carried out on the basis of  the pension and health c·are projections examined 
in Section 2.1.2.25 Revenues artd.otherexpenditure items were assumed constant to GDP. 
Under these assumptions,  in most co.untries  primary balances  improve up  to  the  yee:rr 
2000  and  deteriorate  thereafter,  particularly  after  2015.  Over  the  period  2000-2030, 
primary balances deteriorate by 11  percentage points of GDP  in Finland,  10 points-in 
Italy, 9 point~ in Austria  and the Netherlands, 6 to 7 points in Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Japan,  Portugal,  Spain and Sweden,  4 points in the United States,  2 in the 
· United Kingdom and less than 1 point in Ireland (see Table 3). 
On the basis of  these projections and different assumptions on interest rates on the public 
debt, the OECD's studies estimated the increase in tax revenues required to keep the debt 
to GDP ratio constant from the year 2000 onwards.  26 In other words, they estimated the 
increase in tax rates which, in each year, would offset the increase in public expenditure 
determined by ageing.  27  Assuming constant interest rates,  in· the period up  to  2015, in 
most countries, the adjustment required was in the 1.5 to 3 per cent range, the exceptions 
being Austria and Japan, where larger tax increases would be needed, and Belgium and 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
See Englert et at. ( 1994) and Lambrecht et at.  ( 1994 ). 
See Leibfritz et at. ( 1995}, Roseveare et a/. ( 1996) and OECD ( 1996). 
As to pensions, the primary balance estimate considers the baseline scenario. As to the health care, it refers to 
the. scenario assuming that the cost of health services grows in  line with per capita GDP and. that health care 
consumption depends on population .structure and increases in line with the number of  elderly citizens. 
The debt level  projected for the year 2000 is  based on the assumption that fiscal  consolidation takes place 
according to the path indicated by the OECD's Medium Term Reference Scenario. 
This indicator corresponds to Blanchard's short-term gap. 
17 Italy, where tax revenues could be reduced (see Table 6). By the year 2030 increases in 
tax revenues of 5 to ·1 0 percentage points: (){:GOP ·would be require~ iii mO$t countries. 
Greater increases would be needed inAu5tpa and Italy, while smaller increases would  __ be 
required in Denmark, I:r;eland,..Sweden and the U~ted  Kingdom~ 
2.2 Generational Accounting studies 
Generational Accounting is a -new technique used to study tJ.?.e  effects· of  fiscal policy on 
different  generations.  More specifically,  it  can  assess  the  distributional  implications · 
across generations of changes in budgetary policies and highlight the effects of policy 
changes  that .'do  not  affect  the  conv6ntional  deficit.  Generational· Accounting · also 
provides  estimates.  of long-term  sustainability of budgetary. policies  on the  basis  of 
present  expenditure  ·and  taxation  ·poliCies,  present  net  public  debt  and  expe.cted 
demographic and macroeconomic trends. The meth<?dology of Generational Accounting 
is briefly presented in Box 3. 
Box3 
The methodology of Gene_rational Accounting 
Generational Accounting assesses the present value  of transfers,  services and  taxes received 
and paid for by different ·generations (annual cohorts of the  pppul~tion) under the inter-temporal 
budget constraint requiring that the present value of future taxes is equal to the· present value of 
future  government consumption,  less  the· initial  stock of debt Future  taxes  are  split  into  the 
amount to be paid  by all existing generations from  the base-year to  the end of their lives and 
those that are to be paid by all future generations. Cash transfers (e.g. pensions) are considered 
as negative taxes and detracted by future taxes.· 
The budget constraints can be expressed as: 
Stock  of  current  Present  value  of  all  Present value of all net  Present  value 
of  all  future . 
government 
consumption 
= government  . net  +  future  net  tax·  +  tax  payments  qf  all 
or, in algebraic form: 
wealth  _payments  of all  living  future generations  · 
generations 
oo  ·D  oo 
- L  Gs(1 +  r t-:-s =  ~G  + L  Nb,b;_s + L  Nb,b+s 
s=b  .  s=O  s=l 
where Gs  = government consumption in period s; 
~a =  government net wealth in the base year b (minus in case of net debt); 
N 6,k =  present value in  the base year b of all future net tax payments of the generation 
born in the year k; 
r  =  real interest rate; 
D  = maximum age (constant value). 
More  specifically,  the  present value  in  the  base  year b  of all  future  net tax  payments  of. the 
generation  born in the year k,  N 6,k, can be-expressed as: 
k+D  . 
Nb,k =  L  r:,k ps,k (1 + r )b-s 
s=max(b,k) 
where  T;,k  = average per capita net tax payments in year s of the cohort born in year k; 
~.k = number of surviving members in year s of the cohort born  in year k. 
18 Generational  accounts  are  constructed  so  that  no  policy  changes  are  envisaged  tqr.  present 
generations_.(ev~n if present.policies are unbalanced), while future generations bear the burden 
for restoring lhe  ·' sustainability  of public  finances.  It. is  also  assumed  that  the  adjustment of 
· budgetary· jpolicies  take  place  on  the ·tax  side.  The  difference  between  present  and  future 
generations'.  net taxes provides a measure of  the imbalance in present fiscal policy. 
More specifically, Generational Accounting compares the net discounted taxes paid  by the. new-
born generation on the basis of present expenditure and· revenu~ policies, with the net  discounted 
taxes paid by future generations ori the basis of present expenditure policies and the increase in 
tax rates required by the inter-temporal budget cons_traint.· 
The first step in the development of generational accounts for.allliving and future cohorts of 'the 
population consists in the attribution of present gov.ernment revenues and outlays to the different 
age-groups.  On  the revenue· side,  Generational Accountfng studies usually consider labour and 
capital  income taxes,  social ·security contributions  and  indirect taxes;  on  the  expenditure  side, 
they consider the main socialirpnsfers (pensions, family allowances, unemployment benefits) and 
age-related public consumption  programmes. (health,  education).  For each  item, ·an  age-related 
profile of the ratio of revenue or expenditure to  per capita GOP  is developed.  For revenue and 
e~penditure items that cannot be assigned to specific age-groups a uniform distribution on age-
groups is assumed. 
The  Generational  Accounting methodology was  first ·applied  i~  ·the United  States  by 
Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1991). In the United States (Office of Management 
and Budget,  1994) and Norway28  (Ministry of Finance) it has also been introduced in 
official budget documents.  Estimates have since been produced for Denmark, Finland, 
i  . 
Germany, Italy and Sweden.29 
In 1995  OECD produced estimates for the United States, Germany, Italy, Norway and 
Sweden.  The main results  are reported  in Table  7.  The  imbalance in fiscal policy is . 
extremely large for Italy, where future generations would be expected to pay .net taxes 
more than five times higher· than those paid by the ·new-born generation under present 
policies. In the United S~tes taxes ori future generations would be twice as high as those 
on the new-born generation: In Germany, Norway and Sweden the increase in net taxes 
would_range between 27 and 53 per cent. 
Generational Accounting, as already pointed out, evaluates the long-term sustainability of 
· budgets  taking  the  interaction  of demographic  and  macroeconomic  scenarios  into 
account. However, it is liable to the same limitations listed above for public expenditure 
projections;  it does  not consider the  future  effects  of past changes  in legislation, the 
·changes in economies/diseconomies of scale, the effects ·of demographic developments 
on relative prices and work, consumption and investment decisions.30 
The usefulness of Generational Accounting, as against traditional expenditure and deficit 
projections, in estimating the effects of demographic changes and monitoring budgetary 
trends in Member States is  limited by the fact that Generational Accounting does not 
28 
29 
30 
For the application ofGenerationa1 Accounting to Norway, see alsoAuerbach et at.  (1993) and Steigum and 
Gjersem ( 1996). 
See, respectively, Jensen and Raffelhtischen (1995), Prime Minister Office of Finland (1994),  Gokhale et al. 
( 1994  ), Franco et al.  ( 1994 ), and Hagemann and John. ( 1995).  · 
For a critical review of Generational Accounting see Haveman ( 1994) and Buiter (1995). 
19 -p~ovide indications about the. timing of  the effects of demographic changes, nor does .it 
: outline budgetary trends over the short- and medium-term. Moreover, its results are not 
-intuitive,  which may hamper their use  for .policy objectives, and are very  s~nsitive to 
assumptions about the determination of private consumption, productivity growth and 
discount rates.Jl ·  · 
For all these reasons, this study follows the approach outlined in Section 2:1. However, it 
makes  extensive  use . of  the  age-related  expenditure  profiles·  developed  within 
Generational  Accounting  studies.  Generational  accounts,  which  provide  considerable 
.  insight.into the impact ,offis~al policy on the lifetime budget constraints of  households of 
'  different generations, would represent a useful complement to the indicators presented in 
-this study.  · 
3. Mechanical effects of  demographic changes on public expenditure 
This section provides some estimates ·of the direct effects. of demographic changes on 
public  expenditure  in  the  six _EU  Member States  for  which  age-related  expenditure 
profiles are .available. As already mentioned, it is a mechanical exercise projecting future 
expenditure trends on the basis of initial age-related expenditure profiles and. changing 
demographic population structures. These estimates update arid improve the results of  the 
studies mentioned in· Section 2.1 and are obviously subject t~ the same limitations  .. 
The  methodology .of the  estimates  is  presented·  in  Section  3.1.  The  results of the 
projections are presented in Section 3  .2.  More  specifically,· Section 3 .2.1  outlines the 
baseline estimates for the burden of age-related public expenditure on the working-age 
population. Sections 3  .2.3 and 3  .2.4 consider alternative estimates, based respectively on · 
different dynamics·ofper capita expendi~e  and ~emographic  scenarios. 
3.1 The methodology 
The mechanical effects of  demographic changes are assessed identifying the major items 
. of public expenditure particularly dependent on population age. structure.  Data on per 
capita  expenditure  for  different  ageigroups  and  for  different  budgetary  items  are 
combined with demographic projections. More specifically, the. estimates, which cover 
the period 1995-2050~ are based on the following two sets of  data: 
a)  demographic scenarios developed by EUROSTAT for  the  15  EU  Member States. 
for  the  period  1995-2050  (see  Annex  B).  Three  scenarios  are  considered,  the 
baseline  and,  in  order to  identify  the  range  of possible  effects  of demographic 
changes,  two  extreme  scen¥ios (the  'youngest population'  and  the  'most-aged 
population' sc~narios  ). 
b)  national estimates· of the per capita amount of public expep.diture concerning the 
citizens of each age-group.  Six European countries are  t~en into consideration: 
.Belgium, Finland, Germany,  Italy,  Spain and Sweden.  Most estimates have been 
produced  in  research  work  on  Generational  Accounting.  According  to  the 
av:ailability of  the data, the coverage of  the profiles in terms of  expenditure items is 
31  On this issue see Hagemann and John (1995) and IMF (1996). 
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 different among countries. For some countries profiles. are not available for. all the 
major  age-related  expenditure  sectors  (e~g.  for  Genil.an,  Sp~sh and  Swedish 
.education expenditure and for Swedish health expenditure) . 
.  3.1.1  The expenditure. profiles. - Citizens  of different  sex and  age-groups  c~nsume . 
different ·amounts  of public  services.  They  also · receive. different  ru.nounts  of public · 
transfers.  Expenditures for educational and health services,  pension benefits and child · 
a~lowances are the budget items ·most dependent <?n the age-structure of  the population. In 
order to compare different countries and periods, the· amount spent for each. age-group 
has been expressed as a percentage ofper·capita GDP (see Box 4). 
·Box4 
Age-related expenditure profiles · 
In order to evaluate the e.ffects of demographic changes on public expenditure, it is necessary to 
estimate the  average amount spent for the  members of each  age-group and  sex within  each · 
expenditure program. Total expenditure in  the base year should be allocated among males (M) 
and females (F) such as:  · 
with  OGZ· 
b  ggik 
ph 
I 
i 
b 
k 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
total age-related public expenditure for budgetary item k in the base year b; 
expenditure for budgetary item k .per member of each age~group i in 
national currency in the base year b; 
population in each age-group in the base year b; 
·o, 90; 
base year: 
budgetary item (e.g., pensiQn expenditure, health care expenditure). 
In recent years· age-related public expenditure profiles nave been ·estimated for some. countries 
either within studies projecting the  ~ffects of demographic changes on  public budgets (Belgium,· 
Spain)  or  within  ·research  work. on  Generational  Accounting  (Finland,  Germany,  Italy  and 
Sw~den). The  profiles  for  Finland  and  Italy  cover  all  public expenditure:  those  for  the  other 
countries  cover only  some  important age-related  items  (Table  8).  Different  male  and  female 
profiles have been computed for Germany, Italy and Sweden. The profiles for Finland, Germany 
and Italy refer to 1-year age-groups, those for Belgium and Sweden,  respectively, to 5-year and 
1  0-year age-groups. Spanish profiles consider only three large age-groups. 
For the purpose of this paper, ·per capita expenditure for  each age-group (gg!) has been divided 
by base-year per capita GOP obtaining the following identity: 
with  a;  =  total age-related public expenditure for budgetary item k in the base year b in 
terms of the base-year per capita GOP; 
b  g;k  =  expenditure for budgetary item k per member of each age-group i in  national 
currency in the base year bin terms of the base-year per capita GDP. 
The  national  profiles  for  the  different  age-related  expenditure  items  are  presented  in 
Annex  C.  Charts  1  a-1 b  outline  the  profiles  for  male  and  female  total  age-related 
21 expenditure.32 For instance, the-estimate for.total age-related expenditure for the 0-4 age~ 
group in Belgium (.221) means that in the base-year (1988) the puolic ·se<?torspent 22.( 
per cent of  per capita GDP in order to provide services to each 0-4 year old citizei,l. The 
profiles are not fully comparable. since national estimates differ 'in terms of·coverage· 'of 
expenditure items. For instance, education expenditure is not covered for Germany,' Spain 
and Sweden and health care expenditure· is  not covered. for  Sweden.  The. expenditure 
programs taken into consideration.represent.about 40 per cent oftotai.public expenditure 
(net ofinterest payments) in Sweden and Germany, about 50 per cent in Spain, 62-65 per 
cent in Belgium and nearly 8~  per cent in Finland.  ·  · · 
Profiles including all main items are typically ·two-peaked (see the. profiles for Belgium 
and Italy). The first peak occurs in the 10-20 age group with education expe~diture as the 
most important item. The second peak, reaching higher levels, occurs for the 60~80  ·age-
groups and is largely determined by pension and health expenditure trends .. The lowest 
expenditure levels are usually recorded for  the 30-50 age groups.  Female expenditure 
levels  are lower- than male levels.  The Finnish profile presents two more  pe~: high 
expenditure in the first year of  life and in the over eighty age-group.  · 
Charts '2a-2b compare the male ·and female profiles for pension expenditure. in the six 
cotintries taken into consideration. Separate male and female profiles are available only 
for Genna11.y, Italy and Sweden. Per capita expenditure increases earlier in-Flnl~d, Italy 
and Sweden, where, on average, 61  year old male33 citizens· receive  pe~ion payments 
amounting to about 55 per cent of  per capita GDP. The Finnish male and female profile 
. peaks ·fot the 64:-69 age gro:ttp at about 65  per cent of per capita GDP. The  .. Iti.tlian. and 
Swedish male profiles peak at.about 80 per cent of per capita GDP.respectively.for the 
65-75 and the 70-79 age groups. This-is about tWice the percentage recorded by German 
males in the 70-75 age range. For Belgian males and females, expenditure pe~s  at about 
55 per cent of  per capita GDP for·the 69-73 age groups. The Spanish.profileis flat from 
65 onwards at 58 per cent of  per capita GDP. Female profiles are much' lower than for 
male; they peak at 52 per cent of  per capita GDP in Sweden, 40 per cent· in Italy and 22 
per cent in Germany. 
In each country health expenditure iricreases gradually with age (see Chart 3). Belgium 
and  Spain record  the  highest expenditure. levels  up  to  the  50  age  group.  The~eafter 
Finland, Italy and Spain r~cord the highest levels. The Finnish profile records a peak for 
new-born children (7  .5  per cent); expenditure is in the 2.5-4 per cent range  fo~ the age 
groups between 1 and 49; it increa5es gradually for the following age groups (it is over 
the 20 per cent level for the 83  and over groups). Italians aged 74 and over cost 13  per 
cent of per capita GDP, as against 2.5  per cent for children and 3 to 4.5  per cent for 
people in the 20 to 50 age group. Expenditure for. 65  and over Spanish is about 13  per 
cent ofGDP, as against 4.3 per cent for children and 5.3 per cent for the 15-64 age group. 
Elderly Belgian (  60 and over) would cost about 8 per cent of per capita GDP, as against 
less than 3 per cent for children aged in the 5 to 19 range and 4 to 5.5 per cent for citizens 
aged in the 20 to 50. German expenditure ranges from less than 2 per cent of per capita, 
GDP for children under 10 to 7 pet cent for men over 60 and women over 70. 
32  For Germany, West-Germany profiles are considered in th.is paragraph. 
33  Males and females in the case of  Finland. 
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I. Education expenditure profiles  are-:~vailable only for  Belgium,  .Fi~arid. and_ Italy (see  · 
Chart 4). Expenditure peaks at abqpt25 'per cent of  per capita ·GDP in Belgium (for the 
15-19 age group) and in Finland (for th~ 7-17 ·age group). The Italian profile is over 20 
. per cent  for the 6-15 group with~  peakof29 percent for the 10 year old group.34 
The profiles for unemployment benefits and labour market assistanpe are available for 
Belgium,  Finland,  Germany,  Spain· and  Sweden  (see  Chart  5))5  Separate  male  and 
female profiles are available for Germany and Sweden.  Th~re is a peak for the 20-30 age 
group in Belgil1Ill (at 5.5 per_centof.per capita GDP), Gertnany (2 per cent for males and 
1 per cent for  females)  and  Sweden (14.5  and  9 per cent respectively  for  males  and 
females) and a second peak for the 55-60 group in Belgium (10 per cent) and Germany (4 
and 1.5 per cent for males and females). Finnish expenditure ranges between 7 and 9 per 
cent for all20-59 age groups·.  .  .  · 
Profiles for family allowances are available for Belgium, Finland, Gerinany, Italy, Spain 
and  Sweden.  It should be  considered that in the  Italian and  Swedish estimates  child 
allowances have been imputed to parents (Chart 6). Allowances El:fe very high in Finland 
for children aged 0 to 2. In Belgium, they nearly reach 1  o· per' cent of  per capita GDP for 
the 10-14 age group. They are relatively low for Italy and Spain. 
3.1.2 The projections - The expenditure profiles  (g!) reported in Charts  1-6  and in 
Annex C (expressed in percentage terms of the base-year per capita GDP) · have been ' 
multiplied by the population in each age-group for the years 1995-2050 ( P/ ). 
where  j  =  1995, 2050 
b =  1995. 
By dividing by the 1995 data, this provides an index of  the change in age-relatedpublic 
expenditure in terms of base-:year per capita GDP  under the assumption of tinchanged 
. average public expenditure (in per capita GDP terms) for the members of  each age-group. 
This index (henceforth defined-as index A) can be computed for each expenditure item k 
and for total age-related expenditure· (by calculating the weighted average of the indices 
referring to the different expenditure items). 
Index A  measures the pure effects of  demographic changes (i.e., changes in the size of 
population  groups  relevant  to  different  expenditure  programs  and  changes  in  the 
34 
35 
The difference between the Belgian and Finnish pro'files and the Italian profile is  probably related to lower 
attendance ratio in Italian secondary schools. 
In the case of Italy unemployment benefits are included in the item "Other social benefits". 
23 proportion of  population in the different groups) on the ·"demand" for public services and 
.  transfers,·under the abo:ye-mentioned assumption.  · _ 
Index A does not me~ure  the burden that ~ill be' carried by ·workers and taxpayers, since 
the number ·of workers and tax:payers  will also .  be affected by change in demographic 
.structure. An  assessment of  this b~den  requires that trends in the size.and productivity of  . 
.  the labour force (i.e., trends in GDP) are also taken· i·~to ac~ount. 
Two indices (B and. C) have been developed in order to con~ider these f~~tors (for a brief 
'overview ofthe formulae used for the computation ofthe.two indices, See Box 5). 
Index  B.  measures the  trend of  the  ratio of  public expenditure  to  GDP,  based on  the 
assumption· thai per capita expenditure grows as per capita GDP. This index is suitable 
for  evaluating  the  burden· for.  transfer  expenditure  aimed  at  ensuring  that  benefit 
recipients have a living standard comparable to that of  other citizens. 
Index  C 'tneasur{!s  the  trend of  the  ratio of  public expenditure  to  GDP,  based on the 
assumption that per capita expenditure grows as GDP per worker.  This index is suitable 
for  expenditure programs  mos~ly repres~nted by wages,  such as ·education and health 
care. 
Box5 
Indices of  the burden of  age.:related expenditure on citizens of  working-age 
The indices of the· ratio of age-related public expenditure ·to GOP  have been ·estimated for each 
age-related expenditure item considered in Section 3, on the basis of the following assumptions: 
a)  the change in the number of workers and tax-payers has been assumed to be proportional 
to the change in the number of working-age citizens, which is equivalent to assuming that 
the aggregate labour force· pa~icipation rate and unemployment rate remain constant over 
the projection period.  · 
b)  The rate of growth of GOP has been determined on the basis of the change in the number 
of working-age citizens and the rate of increase in  their productivity (rw), which has been 
assumed constant over time (even though demographic changes are actually likely to have  . 
repercussions on productivity growth). Because of the changes in population structure, per· 
capita GOP growth (which depends on rw  and the population·structure) is different from per 
worker GOP growth. 
c)  Age-related public expenditure profiles have been  projected to the future. on  the basis of 
two alternative assumpti.ons: 
i)  public expenditure for the  members of each age-group increases at a yearly  rate 
equal to the rate of growth of per capita GOP (index B); 
ii)  public expenditure  for the members of each  age-group  increases at a yearly  rate 
equal to the rate of growth of GOP per worker (index C).  · 
The indices can be expressed as: 
24 90  .  .  . 
·  ~{g! x  gdp~(l+rwY-h  x'~j) 
t=O  .  ·  . 
90 
~(g!  x  gdp~(l+rc)j-h x  ~j) 
t=O  ..  . 
90  '  . - . 
. L(g!  ~  gdp~  x-~h) 
and  ck =  ----=--:-i=~o  _____________  _ 
64 
i=O 
where:  gdp~ 
gdp~ 
-ph 
I 
j 
. rw 
rc 
90 
. L~h  xgdp~-
i=O  . 
= per capita GOP in the base-year b; 
= GOP per worker in the base-year b;_ 
L~j  x gdp~(l+rwy-h 
..  i=20 
64 
LP/ xgdp~ 
.i=20  . 
= population in  eac~  age-group ·in  th~ base year b;  · 
=·1995, 2050; 
= growth rate of GDP per worker; 
=growth rate of per  capita GDP. 
The two indices can·be expressed as follows: 
and 
The two indices can·therefore be calculated as the ratio of index-A to the index of the growth of 
total-population (index 8) or to the index of the growth of working-age population (index C).  This 
implies that no assumptions are actually required for the level of r  w. The two indices B and C also 
represent the burden of age-related public expenditure on the working-age population. 
A fourth  "mixed" index (D)  has been computed by projecting expenditure· profiles for 
transfers  on· the  basis of  per capita _GDP .growth  (i.e.,  of index  B)  and expenditure  . 
profiles for public services 'on  the  basis of  per worker GDP. growth. (i.e., of index C). 
While indices A, B and C are computed for each expenditure item as well as  for total 
expenditure, index D  is computed only for  total. expenditure.  The baseline projections 
presented in the following sections refer to this mixed index  .. 
Before  analysing  the  results  of the  projections,  some  notes  of caution  should  be 
addressed  .. 
a)  The coefficients  g;~
995  have been estimated on the basis of 1988 data for Belgium, 
1991  data for Spain, 1992 data for Germany,  1993 data for Finland; 1994 data for 
Italy and 1995 preliminary data for Sweden. 
b)  As already pointed out, the ratios are not directly comparable since not all the same 
items  are taken into  account for  each country (Table  8).-·For instance,  German, 
Spanish and Swedish estimates do  not take  education expenditure into  account. 
This -tends  to  overestimate the  effects  of ageing  on  public .  expenditure  in these 
25 countries.  On  the  other  hand,  the  fact  that  the  share  of public  expenditure · 
considered for these countries Is much lower than the share co4sidered for the other 
three countries tends to underestimate the effect ·of a~eing. 
3.2 The results: the burden on working-age population 
The first part of this section focuses on  the results referring to index D in the baseline · 
demographic scenario. The, second onindices Band Cin the same demographic scenario.  · 
The third· on index D under alternative demographic scep.arios.  The results for index A 
(i.e.,  the  change  in  the  'demand'  of public  expenditure  determined  by demographic 
changes) are presented in Annex D. 
3.2.1 Baselin.e economic and demographic projections - As indicated in Section 3.1, in 
the  baseline  economic  projection  the  burden  of .  age-related  public  expenditure  on 
working-age population is  computed assuming that present per capita expenditure for 
education and health grows in line with GDP per worker, while expenditure for transfers 
grows in line with per capita GDP (i.e. index D)  .. 
Index·  D  depends  on the  effects  of demographic  changes  on the  'demand'  of public 
expenditure (i.e., index A) and on the number of  working-age citizens, i.e., the number of 
potential workers~ Over the period 1995-2050, in the baseline demographic scenario the 
number of  working-age citizens is expected to-decline by 29 per cent in Italy, 21  per cent 
in Spain, 19 per cent in Germany, 11  per cent in Finland and 9 per cent in Belgium. It is 
expected to increase by 8 per cent in Sweden.  · 
T_he  burden of  total age-related expenditure would increase substantially over the next 
decades in all the  ~ix.countries considered (see Chart 7).  By the year 2010 the burden· 
would increase by 13 per cent in Germany, 10 per cent in Italy, 7 per centin Finland and 
4 to 6 per cent in Belgium, Spain and Sweden. The rate of  increas~ would accelerate over 
the following 15 years. By the year 2025 the burden would be higher than in 1995, by 29 
per cent in Germany, 25 per cent in Italy, 19 to 20 per cent in Finland and Spain, 16 per 
cent in Belgium an~ 10 per cent in Sweden. Over the period 2025~2040 national trends 
would  be· rather  different;  while  the  burden  would  increase  substantially  in  Italy, 
Germany and Spain, its growth· would slow down in Belgium, Finland and Sweden. By 
the year 2040 the burden would have peaked in Italy (with a 44 per cent increase over 
1995), Germany (  43 per cent), Finland (25 per cent), Belgium (22 per cent) and Sweden 
(12 per cent). It would still be growing in Spain (to 53 per cent in 2050). 36 
Pension expenditure trends, which contribute substantially to the expected increases in 
total expenditure, are rather homogeneous (see Chart 8a). By the year 2010 real pension 
e:Xpe~diture would increase by 10 per cent in Sweden, by about 15 per cent in Belgium, 
Italy, and Spain and by nearly 22-24 per cent in Finland and Germariy. By the year 2035 
it would increase by 25 per cent in Sweden, 50· per cent i~ Belgium and Finland, and by 
60-70 per cent in Germany, Italy and Spain. 
36  In comparing the dynamics of age-related· expenditure  burden  in  the  six countries,  it should be  taken  into 
consideration that education expenditure is  not considered for  Germany,  Spain and  Sweden.  This tends to 
overestimate the impact of demographic charges in these countries. 
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1995  2000  2005  2010  2015  2020  2025  2030  2035  2040  2045  2050 In. Finland, Germany and Belgium the burden for health care increases gradually up to 
2035, by 5.1, 32 and 24 per cent respectively. In Itaiy and' Spain it peaks later, with 51 and 
41 per cent respectively(see Chart 8b).  ·  . 
Education· provides· some . scope  for  expenditure  cuts  .. The ·pattern of the  burden  for 
education is similar for Belgium ·and Finland: declining in the period up)o 2010-2015, 
t~en stable for  about' a decade, then increasing again up  to  the period 2035-2040, and 
eventually declining  again  at the  end of the  projection period  (~ee Chart  8c)~ Italy's 
pattern is less smooth, with two· throughs~  .tn 2003 (  -10 per cent as against the 1995 level) 
and 2029 (-15 per cent), and two peaks, iri 2015 (-6 per cent) and 2045 -(-4per cent). 
Charts  9a-f report  the  effects  of demographic  changes  on  each  age-related  public· 
expenditure item for the six .countries in the baseline scenario. The dispersion among the 
expenditure  trends  for  each  different  item  is  very  high. in ·Spain  and  Germany  and 
relatively limited in Sweden~ 
3.2.2  Alternative  dynamics  of per capita  expenditure  - Charts  lOa-f _present  the 
implications of alternative dynamics of per capita expenditure. If all expenditure items 
grow as per capita GDP (index B), the total burden is slightly lower than in the baseline 
scenario.  If they grow as  the  GDP  per worker  (index  C),  ~he burden is  substantially 
higher.  This is due to :the  different weights of the two  groups of items in the baseline 
scenario. In all countries, the expenditure for transfers is  more important than that for 
serviCes, like health and education. This is particularly relevant for Sweden, where, under . 
the pessimistic scenario, only a very small share is assum~d  to. grow as GDP per worker. 
i 
In ·the optimistic S(!enario, the burden is expected to grow only slightly less than in the 
baseliile  case  .. In  ~elgium and  Finland  the  difference  increases  gradually  up  to.  a 
maximum of. 5 percentage points  from  2015  onwards;  in  Germany  and  Italy  it starts 
increasing already at the beginning of next century,  reaching  a peak ,of 7-8  points in 
2040-45; in Spain tll.e difference is not significapt until2030, while thereafter it increases 
to 7 percentage points; finally, in Sweden there is almost no difference with the burden 
expected in the baseline scenario·. 
More important divergences from the burden expected in the baseline scenario are to be 
recorded within the pessimistic scenario, with the highest in Italy (more than 20 per. cent 
in 2045), Germany (17 per cent in 2040), and Spain (17 per cent in 2045). 
3.2.3 Alternative demographic scenarios- Charts lla-f  compare the expenditure trends-
under the baseline economic scenario and three different demographic scenarios. For all 
six countries, the prospects for the burden of total age-related expenditUre on working-
age population are much more pessimistic under the assumption of an older population 
('most-aged  population'  scenario),  while  they  are  more  optimistic  in  the  youngest 
population scenario. 
More  specifically,  in  the  countries  for  which  education  expenditure  is  considered 
(Belgium, Finland and Italy), real expenditure trends under the diffe4rent scenarios are 
rather close up  to  the year 2035,  since, under the  most-aged  scenario,  the  increase in 
pension expenditure is partly offset by the decrease in education expenditure and, in the 
same  way,  under  the  youngest  population  scenario  the  lower  increase  in  pension 
expenditure  is  aggravated  by  a  lower  decrease  (or  even ·an  increase)  in  education 
27 expenditure. Over the longer term, the burden is expected to diverge more substantially 
. according to, the demographic scenario, due to the fact that after 204Q demographiq:.tre11ds . 
. start to converge and the opposite effects of  young-related and old-related expen~:liture-are 
less pronounced.  ·  - - .  . 
.  . 
.  .  . 
The difference iri expenditure trends is greatest in Germany, Spain and, to a lesser degree, 
·in Sweden, where, over the whole projection period, the highest increases in expenditure 
levels  are recorded  in the  most~aged scenarios,  since  there. is  no  offsetting  education 
expenditure effect. 
4. National estimates of  pension expenditure trends 
Pension expenditure growth cannot be accurately forecast on the basis of demographic 
trends alone. Pension expenditure dynamics are also influenced by changes in legislation 
(that  de-fines  eligib~lity  rules:.  the  amount  granted  to ..  new -pensioners,  indexation 
mechanisms, etc;),  past~and present employment (that influences the length of workers' 
m~mbership in pension schemes and the  distribution of workers  among the  different 
schemes); and social attitudes  (as  those towards  early retirement and the demand for 
disability benefits).37 While legislation basically determines the supply of pensions, the 
other factors define the demand for them stemming from citizens. 
Any assessment of  future pension expenditure must therefore consider the likely changes 
in the eligibility and transfer ratios, respectively the ratio of  the number of  pensions to the 
nuniber of  elderly citizens and the ratio of  the average pension to per capita or per worker 
GDP (see Box 6). While from the 60s to the mid-80s these changes increased expenditure 
in _most countries, in the future they. are likely to work both ways. In some countries the 
effects  of past extensions  cmd  improvements  to· pension  schemes  are  still  expanding 
expenditure;  in  others,  the  recently  introduced  reforms  are  reducing  eligibility  and 
transfer ratios. The latter might also be negatively influenced by the· present widespread 
unemployment, which limits the contribution record of  future pensioners  .. 
Box6 
· ·Factors influencing pension expendit~re· 
In order to highlight the problems faced  in  projecting pension expenditure, one can refer to some 
simple  accounting  identities.  Following  the  OECD  (1988b)  approach,  the  ratio  of  pension 
expenditure ( EXP  P) to GOP can be expressed on the basis of the four following ratios: 
a) 
.b) 
c) 
37 
The Old-age  dependency  ratio  = Population  at  pensionable  age  (PO~) divided  by  the 
population at working age (POPw). 
The Eligibility ratio=  Number of pension beneficiaries (NPEN) divided by the population at 
pensionable age (PO~). 
The  Transfer ratio = Average  pension  per  beneficiary  (p
0
)  divided  by  GOP per worker 
(gdpw). 
See OECD (1988b). 
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The ratio of public expenditure on old~age pensions to  .. GOP can therefore -be written as: 
'EXPP  (PO~) (NPEN)  (  Pa  )·(. POPw--) 
· GDP  =  POP~  :  x_  POPp  _x  gdp~  x  NwOR 
Ratio a)  n:~present the pure demographic· component of expenditure  dynamics~ Ratios b) and-c), 
depend on legislation and economic factors.  Ratio d) is affected by economic· factors.  Ratios b) 
and c) can change considerably. over time because of..the 'maturing' of pension schemes, i.e. the 
proeess  of adjustment 'of all  pensions to  present retirement rules.  On the_ one  hand,  pens-ion  . 
coverage extensions and benefit improvements usually produce their full effects on the two ratios 
-after  many  decades.  On  th~  other, · quite  often·  pension  reforms  curtailing  benefits  are 
implemented gradually and only display their ~II effects a  long ·time later. 
Changes in  the relative  number of workers enrolled in the different schemes are also likely to 
influence ratios b) and c)._ In many eollntries,forinstance, in the last decades public employment 
has  grown  faster than· total  employment  and,  $ince  public  employees· frequently  have  better 
retirement rules, the shift in employment increases pension expenditure. 
According  to  OECD  (1988b),  between  1960  and  1985.  in  the  OECD  col,Jntries  the  old-age  . 
dependency,· eligibility,  transfer- and  employment  ratios  respectively  contributed  to  25.6,  38.0, 
33.2, and 3.2 per cent of total change in the pension expenditure to GOP ratio. Among the 15 EU 
countries, only in Denmark and the United Kingdom was the old-age dependency ratio the most .. 
relevant factor in·contributing to._expenditure growth. These data reflect the widespread process of 
expansion of pension coverage and improvement of benefits that took _place  in many European 
countries from the fifties to the seventies. 
'  ' 
In order to take·th~ non-demographic factors affecting p~nsion  expendi:tttre dynamics into 
·  consideration,  this  section  draws  on  the  resUlts  o_f  the  most  recent ·  public  pension 
expenditure projections carried ·out in each country by a public institution.JS  This also 
allows- consideration. of the maturation of pension systems,  i.e.,  the  fact  that pension 
expenditure  dynamics  over  the  n~xt decades  will  be  influenced  by  changes  already 
introduced  in  legislation.  The  projections  taken  into  consideration  are  based  on the 
assumption of  imchanged policies. This approach may lead to some unrealistic outcomes, 
since  policies  will  obviously  adapt  over  time  to  new  demographic  and  economic 
circumstances,  but  it  is  helpful  in  identifying  the  dimension  of required  policy 
adjustment. 
National  projections  are  not  homogeneous  in their  coverage  of pension expenditure. 
Therefore, although they provide some useful indications about trends in future pension 
expenditure in the EU Member States, they do not provide an estimate of the impact of 
the future evolution of  public pension schemes on general governments' accounts. Franco 
and Munzi (1996) tried to fill.this gap by applying each country's projected· expenditure 
trend to an estimate·ofits 1995 ratio of  total public pension expenditure to GDP.39 
38 
39 
These projections have been.examined in  Franco and Munzi (1996).  For Italy the more recent projections 
reported in  S~ate General Accounting Office ( 1996c) have been taken into consideration. 
More specifically, the expected values of the ratio ofpension expenditure to GDP and of  the ECR have been 
turned into an index based on a  1995 value of 1.  Then the index has been multiplied by the ratio of public 
pension  expenditure  to  GDP  estimated  for  1995.  The  latter  data  has  been  computed  in  different  ways, 
according to the data available for each country.  - · 
29 The results of  these estimates for the- si'x countries considered in this paper are presented 
,in Charts  12a and 12b.  Wherever additional scenarios were·consideted in the national. 
projections, the most favourable and the least favourable are used to provide a range for 
·future pension expenditure growth. 
The data can be examined over. three periods: the next five years;the period 2000-2010 
and the period after the· year 2q  10. Between 1_995  and the year 2000, the ratio of  public 
p~nsion  expendi~e  to GDP would grow by 0. 7 percentage points in Germany and by 0.5 
to 0. 7 points in Belgium; it would remain almost stable in Spain, while in Italy it ·would 
remain stable in the best scenario and increase by 1.4 points in the worst. In Finland and 
·Sweden the best and the wqrst economic scenarios point to a decline in the expenditure 
. ratio 'of 0.5· points and to an increase of  0.6- 0.8. points respectiyely. ·  -
Expenditure growth would accelerate  in  the  period  2000-2010.  Over the  decade,  the 
exp~nditure to GDP ratio would grow .by· 1.2  percentage points in Germany;  1 to 2.4 
points in Finland; 0.7 to 2.2 points in Italy,  0.6 to 1.3 points in Belgium, 0.4 to 1 points 
in Sweden. In Spain the ratio would be nearly stable in the best scenario' and increase by · 
0.5 points in the worst. 
After the year 20  1  o· expenditure pressure would rise substantially in most countries. The 
increase expected for the peri()~ 2010-2030 is 3.5 points for Germany, 3 to 3.2 points for 
Belgium, 2.2 to 4.6 points for Italy, 0.6 to 2.4 points for Finland. Expenditure pressures 
would be inore moderate in Spain (0.3 to 1.4 percentage points of GDP) at1d Sweden (0 
to 0.5 points).·  · · 
By comparing the expected trend of the  old-age dependency  ratio  with  those  of the 
expenditure to GDP ratio, it is possible to evaluate the expected future effects of  the non-
demographic  factors  (more  speCifically  t~e effects  of· changes  in  the  eligibility  and 
transfer  ratios).  Charts  13a-f plot  the  two  ratios  for  the. six  countries.  An  old-age 
dependency ratio line above the expenditure line points to a reduction irt the eligibility 
and transfer ratios.  This  implies  that restrictive  reforins,  counterbalancing  the  agdng 
trend, have  alr~ady been implemented in the  pension system.  An old~age dependency 
ratio line close to the expenditure line points to stable eligibility and transfer ratios, and 
therefore to a mature pension system in which expenditure growth depends mostly on 
demographic change. ·An old-age dependency ratio line under the expenditure line points 
to  an  increase  in the  eligibility  and  transfer  ratios.  This  implies  that  the  effects  of . 
demographic changes will be increased by the improvements introduced in pension rules 
in the past or by the gradual increase in workers' contributory records. 
I 
In the  six countries studied, the old-age dependency  line  is  expected to  lie above the 
expenditure line, particularly in the long-term. This is due to a radical change in pension 
policies  with  respect  to  previous  decades:  the  phase  of extension  of coverage  and 
improvement of benefits is over, while several reforms have been implemented to curb 
expenditure.  According to  national projections,  only demographic trends are  presently 
exerting an upward pressure on the expenditure to  GDP;  non-demographic factors  are 
actually going to partly offset the effects of  demographic trends. 
The effects of non-demographic factors can also be evaluated by comparing the national 
pension expenditure· projections with the mechanical projections estimated in Section 3 
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1990  1995  2000  2005  2010  2015  2020  2025  2030  2035  2040  2045  2050 (see Charts 14a-f). The differences in share of  pen8ion expenditure to GDP are very large 
and· tend to .  increase. over the projection  P<1r:i<;>.d.  By the year 2030, the shares would · 
diverge by 0.2 per cent in Belgium, 1.7 in Gem1any, 3.1 in Sweden, 3.7 in Finland, 4.1 in 
Spain and ·5.3  in ·Italy; -by  the end of the projection period,  Belgium would record a 
difference of 1.8 per cent, Italy of7.6 per cent and Sweden 4.8 per cent. 
5. Primary balance trends a.nd budgetary adjustments: tentative. estimates 
The ·-first  part of this  section  integrates  the  mechanical· estimates  of the  effects  of 
demographic changes  on non-pension  items  presented  in Section 3  with the. peD;Sion 
expenditure  projections· considered  in  Section  4  in  order  to  provide  some  tentative 
estimates of the  share of total  age-related  public  expenditure to  GDP  and  to  derive · 
primary balance and. public debt trends under unchanged policy scenarios. The base year· 
is 1997. The first part also provides estimates of  the adju~tment required on the primary 
balance over the period 1998-2030 to implement the "close-to-balance" rule indicated in 
the Stability and Growth Pact. The dimension of the adjustment is also assessed on the 
basis ofthe tax-gap concept, that allows comparisons with alternative fiscal policies, such. 
as, for instailce, keeping the debt to GDP ratio by the end of  the projection period at the 
present level. 
The second part of  the section examines some alternative· scenarios. More speCifically it 
considers the implications of  the exclusion from·· the uncha.itged policy scenario of some 
expenditure and revenue items of  a temporary nature. It also examines the implications of 
different interest rates on the public debt and different productivity growth rates. Finally, 
it evaluates the effects of  taking 1996 rather than 1997 as the base year. 
The third· part of the section. briefly considers the implications of alternative budgetary 
. strategies for the problems raised by population ageing. It shows how the fast contraction 
in_ the debt to Gi>P .ratio determined by the implementation of  the '~close-to-balance" rule 
would allow EU Member States to meet the worsening of. the demographic situation after 
the year 2010 on a sounder fiscal footing. 
5.1  Public  expenditure,  primary  balances  and  budgetary  adjustments:  baseline 
scenario 
5.1.1  Age-related public expenditure40 - In order to  project the  share  of total  age-
related ·public expenditure to GDP, the share of pension expenditure to  GDP is derived 
from the national pension' expenditure projections, while that of  each non-pension item is 
<?Stimated  by multiplying the base year expenditure to GDP ratio by the baseline index 
presented in Section 3.2.1.41  It shouldbe noted_thatt~e total age-related expenditure to 
40 
41 
Since national pension expenditure projections for .Finland, .  Germany, Sweden and Italy are not available up 
to the year 2050,  the estimates presented in this Section cover only  the  period up  to  the  year 2030  for  the 
former three countries and up the year 2045 for the latter. 
More specifically, the estimates for the expenditure to GDP share of the transfer items (excluding pensions) 
refer to Index B,  while those for the share of expenditure programs mostly represented by  wages (education 
and health care) refer to Index C. 
31 G~P  ratios for the different countries are not cmnparable in their levels since, as already 
mentioned; different items were. cons~deted for the six countries.  42  :  · 
Under the baseline demographic a:rld econom.ic scenarios defmed in Section 3, the share 
of total age-related expenditure to GDP is expected to grow substantially in five of'  the 
six countries taken into consideration.43  In Belgium, it ·would  increase  by  4.9 to.  5.6 
percentage  points  over  the  period  1995-2030  (respectively  acc<?rding  to  the  most . 
favourable and the most unfavourable. pension expenditure scenario defined in Section 4) 
and by 3.9 to 4.6 percentage points over the period 1995-:-2050· (see Table 9). Over the 
period 1995-2030, ~Finland and Germany it would increase respectively by 5.9 to 6.8 · 
and by 5.4 percentage points. IIi' Italy the share·of total age-related expenditure to GDP 
would increase by 3.8 to  5~0 percentage points over the period 1995-2030 and by 3.9 to 
6.0 percentage points over the period  1995-2045.  ExpenditUre  growth would be more 
limited in Spain: 1.1 to 2.8 points over the period 1995-2030. 
Sweden is the only country where the share of age-related expenditure to GDP would 
remain  nearly  stable  over the. period  1995-2030  (-0.3  to'  1.1  percentage  points)  and 
decline  thereafter  (-1.8  to  -0.9  points  over the  period  1995-2050).  These  favourable 
prospects are related to the Swedish demographic trends44 and to ihe .expected effects of 
the pension reform outlined in 1994.  It should also  be  considered that education and 
health expenditure ·have not been included in the estimates. 
5  .. 1.2 Primary balances - The projections for age-related expenditure items can be used 
to estimate the changes to ·be  expected .in primary balances, under the assumption that 
age-unrelated  expenditure  items  and  revenues  are  constant  as  a  share ·to .GDP.  This 
assumption  implies  that .  the .  revenues  and  expenditures  of a  temporary  nature  .are 
substituted  with  permanent  revenues · and  expenditures·  (Section  5.4  considers  the 
implication of  removing this assumption for two countries). More specifically, the share 
of  total primary public expenditure to GDP over the next decades, h~  been estimated by · 
adding  to. its  current  share  the  increase  in age-related  public. expenditure  projected 
above.  45  An indicative· measure of the primary balance is  obtained by subtracting from 
the expected share· of  total primary expenditure to GDP, a constant share of revenues to 
GDP.46  -
In Belgium,  Finland,  Germany,  Italy  and  Spain  present  primary surpluses  would  be 
gradually eroded by expenditure increases. In Belgium the primary balance would move 
from a surplus of5.2 per cent in 1997 to close to balance in 2030 and 'to a· deficit of0.8 to 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
The  comparisons  are  more  significant  for  the  specific  expenditure  items  (pensions,  health,  education). 
Nevertheless, also these comparisons should be carried out with some caution, since the same item can include 
slightly different programs in each country. 
It should be stressed that these estimates are based on different base years. See Annex ~· 
As pointed out in Section 3 .2.1, Sweden is the only country for which an increase in working age population 
is expected over the period 1995-2050. See Annex B.  -
Data on current total  public expenditure net of interest payments refer to  the latest' European Commission 
estimates for the year 1997.  · 
The share of revenues to GDP is assumed constant on its  1997 level  as  in  the latest European Commission 
estimates. 
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SHARE OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE TO GDP  Table 9 
Baseline economic and demographic scenario 
Share to GDP  Change over the p~riod 
1995  2000  2010  2020  2030  2040  2050  1995-2030'  1995-2050 
Belgiwn 
Health Insurance  5.4  5.5  5.6  5.9  6.s:·  6.7  .6.6  1.1  1.2 
lawalidity Benefits  2.6  2.6  2.8  2.8  2.7  2.6  2.6  0.1  0.0 
Education  4.5  4.4  4.3'  4.2  4.4  4.5  4.4  -0.1  --9.1 
J>ens.ions best  -10.3  10.8  ll.4  13.1  14.7  14.7  13.7  4.4  3.4 
Pensions worst  10.3  11.0  12.4  14.2  15.5  15.2  14.4  5.2  .4.f 
Unemployment Benefits  3.3  3.2  3.4  3.4  3.1  3.0  3.1  -0.2  -0.2 
Family Allowances  2.:5  . 2.4  .' 2.3  2.2  2.2  2.1  2.2  -0.3  -0.3 
Maternity + Nursery Benefits  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.0 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE best ·  28.8  29.2  29.9  31.8  33.7  33.8  32.7  4.9  3.9 
TOTAL E.YPENDITURE worst  28.8  29.4  30.9  32.9  3.&.4  34.3  '33.4  5.6  4.6 
Finland 
Education  5.9  5.8  5.5  5.5  5.7  5.7  5.6  -0.2  -0.3 
Health Care  5.1  5.2  5.6  6.4  7.3  7.7'  7.7  2.2  2:6 
Social Services  3.6  3.6  3.7  4.3  5.2  5.7  5.7  1.6  2.1 
Net investments  1.4  '1.4  1.4  1.5  1.5  1.6  1.6  0.1  . 0.2 
Transfers related to children  2.9  2.7  2.5  2.4  2.4  2.3  2.3  -0.5  -0.5 
Pensions best  14.0  13.4  14.6  .  16.5  17.1  3.1 
Pensioi1s worsr  14.0  14.8  17.4  17.9  17.9  3.9 
Unemployment Benefits  4.9  4.9  4;7  4.5  4.2  4.3  4.3  -0.7  -0.6 
Other social Transfers  3.6  3.6  3.6  3.7  3.8  3.8  3.8  0.2  0.2 
!ransfers to households  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.8  1.9  1.9  0.1  0.2 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE best  43.0  42.4  43.4  46.6  48.9  5.9 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE worst  43.0  43.8  46.2  48.0  49.8  6.8 
Germany 
Pensions  8.7  9.2  10.1  10.8  12.6  3.9 
Health Insurance  6.5  6.6  7.0  7.3  8.1  8.6  8.5  1~6  2.0 
Accident Insurance  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.2  0.1 
Unemployment  Insurance  1.9  1.8  1.7  1.8  1.7  1.6  .  1.6  -0.1  -0.2 
General Welfare  l.O  l.O  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  0.0  0.0 
Housing Benefits  0.2  .  0~2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.0 
Maternity Benefits  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  -0.1  -0.1 
Child Benefits  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.4  -0.1  -0.1 
TOTAL E.YPENDITURE  19.5  20.1  21.3  22.4  2.&.9  5.4 
Italy 
Education  5.3  4.8  4.9  4.8  4.5  4.9  5.0  -0.8  -0.3 
Health Expenditure  5.6  5.8  6.2  6.7  7.3  8.3  8.4  1.7  2.8 
Pensions best  15.5  15.3  16.0  17.2  18.1  17.8  16.7  2.6  1.2 
Pensions worst  15.5  15.3  16.0  17.7  19.4  19.7  18.8  3.9  3.3 
Family allowances  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.0  0.0 
')ther social bene.fits  1.6  1.6  1.6  '1.7  1.8  1.7  1.6  0.2  0.0 
TOTAL E.YPENDITURE best  28.3  27.9  29.0  30.7  32.1  33.0  32:2  3.8  3.9 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE worst  28.3  27.9  29.0  31.2  33.3  34.9  3.&.3  5.0  6.0 
Spain 
Health Care  6.2  6.1  6.2  6.5  7.0  8.0  8.7  0.8  2.6 
Pensions best  9.9  10.0  10.0  10.1  10.3  0.4 
Pensions worst  9.9  10.1  10.6  l1.2  12.0  2.1 
Unemployment  3.8  3.8  3.7  3.7  3.6  3.3  3.1  -0.2  ~0.7 
Family allowances  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0 
Other  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.6  0.7  0.2  0.4 
TOTAL E.YPENDITURE best  20.3  20.4  20.3  20.7  21A  1.1 
TOTAL E.YPENDITURE worst  20.3  20.5  20.9  21.8  23.1  2.8 
Sweden 
Pensions best  13.7  13.2  13.6  14.3  14.1  13.7  12.6  0.4  -1.1 
Pensions worst  13.7  14.4  15.5  16.0  15.5  14.8  13.4  1.8  -0.3 
Sickpay  1.7  1.8  1.8  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.7  0.0  0.0 
Labour Market  3.8  3.7  3.6  3.6  3.4  3.4  3.5  -0.4  -0.3 
Parents Allowances  1.3  1.3  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.1  l.l  -0.1  -0.2 
Educational Grants  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.6  -0.1  0.0 
Accident Allowances  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.1  0.1 
Child A1l<?wances- 1.1  1.1  1.1  1.0  l.O  1.0  1.0  -0.1  -0.1 
Social Assistance  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  -0.1  -0.1  ;?--b  TOTAL E.YPEXDITURE best  23.6  22.9  23.1  23.7  23.3  22.9  21.8  -0.3  -1.8 
TOTAL EXPESDITURE worst  23.6  2-U  25.0  25.5  2.t.7  24.0  22.7  1.1  -0.9 
.\'o:< · Wh~r~  two data are pres~r.t~d: th.: kft assumes th.: most favourabl.: p.:nsion .:xpcnditurc sc.:nario and the n.;;.ht !h.: n1ost unfavourabk one 1.5  percentage points in 2050 .{See Chart 15a-f). In Finland the .3.9 per cent surplus of 
1997 would turn into a deficit-of 2.3 to· 2.6 points·in 2030. The Geqnan primary surplus 
would turn into a deficit in the frrst dec;ade of the next  c~ntury; the  d~ficit would then . 
gradpally increase up to 4A per cent in 2030. In Italy the present surplus of  6.6 points of 
GDP would gradually decline; in the year 2040 a small primacy deficit would be recorded 
in the worst scenario.  The Spanish 2.2 per. cent surplus would also turn into a  small 
deficit only in the worst scenario  .. Only Sweden would retain a primary surplus in both 
scenarios; the surplus would .. decline to  3.1  to  4  points  in 2030  and then increase to 
around 5 points by the year 2050.  · 
5.1.3 ·Debt to GriP ratio - On !Q.e basis of the primarY balance  trend~ presented above 
and some assumptions on real GDP growth, interest rates and inflation, it is possible to 
estimate the dynamics of  the .debt to GDP ratio under unchanged policies; 
More specifically; it has been ass\nned that ~  all countries: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
productivity per worker increases· by 1  ~5 per cent per year (the standard assumption 
. in OECD's recent studies on long-term.economic prospects),47 
GDP growth depends on productivity groWth and the rate of change in the number 
of. working  age  citizens  (i.e.,  aggregate  labour  force  participation  rates  and 
unemployment rates remain constant over the projection period), 
'inflation and the real iriterest rate oil public debt are respectively 2 and 4 per cent 
over the whole projection period,48 
·the stock-flow adjustment is sistematicallyzero. 
The debt to  GDP .ratio (under unchanged policies) would follow aU-shaped curve· in 
Belgium,. Finland and Spain with the debt·decreasing until the second or third decade of 
the next century and increasing thereafter. More specifically, over the period 1997-2030, 
the ratio. woul_d either decline from 127 to 110 per cent in the best scenario or increase to 
145 per cent-in the worst scenario in Belgium, it would decline from 59 to 35 per cent or 
increase to  100 per cent in Finland, it. would decline from 68  to 56 per cent in the best 
scenario or increase to 91 per cent in the worst scenario in Spain. 
In Italy, where the primary surplus expected for 1997 is .relatively high (  6.6 per cent of 
GDP), the ratio would,decline in both scenarios from 122 per ceQ.t to  respectively 37 and 
50 per cent The ratio would continuously increase in Germany (from 62 per cent in 1996 
to about 213 per cent in 2030), while in Sweden it would decrease substantially and turn 
into  a  net  credit  position  in  the  period  2020-2040,  according  to  different pension 
projections. 
In conclusion, under unchanged policies, in spite of  the decline of  primary surplus due to 
the increase in age-related expenditure, the debt to GDP ratio would decline substantially 
in most countries over the next 2 or 3 decades.  Thereafter,  it would increase in most 
countries. 
47 
48 
See Leibfritz eta/. (1995) and Roseveare eta!. (1996). 
It is assumed that the adjustment of interest payments to the interest rate assumed in the projections takes place 
gradually over four years. 
33 5.1.4  The adjustment  required  by  "close-to-balance"  policies :- 'According  to  the 
Stability. and Growth Pact approved at the  Dublin summit of December  1996, _,EMU 
Members  shou~d,set medium-term budgetary targets of close-to-balance or in surplus.49 
These targets would allow them tQ  respect the 3 per cent ceiling even during economic 
·  downturns.  Taking -the  close-to-baiance. indication and the likely effects. of  downturns 
into consideration, the aver~ge deficit of  these countries may be of  the order  of.1 per cent 
ofGDP.  . 
Assuming that the deficit. is fixed at 1 per cent· from the year 1998 onwards and taking 
.  interest payments into .account,. it is possible to derive the primary balance level required 
by the "close-to-balance" rule.  In .the  f<:>ur  non-heavily indebted countries the required 
primary·surplus would decline from an initial value of3 to 5 points ofGDP to about l to 
2 points by the year 2030 (See Charts  16a-f). In. the two heavily indebted countries it 
would decline from 6.4·per cent of GDP in Belgium and 8.1  per cent in Italy, to about 3 
per cent of GDP. In some countries the reduction is particularly fast ·over the period 
1998-2001; due to the assumption that the real interest·rate on the public debt converges 
to 4·per cent. In all countries the primary balance level required by the "close-to-balance" 
rule is reduced by the decline in interest payments related to the· fast contraction in the 
level of  the debt to GDP ratio.  . 
The  difference  between  this  required ·primary  balance .and  the  trend ·piimary  deficit . 
provides -an indicative measure of the adjustment reqUired by the implementation of the 
·"close-to-balance  rule".  The  adjuStment,  which  reflects  the  changes  in  age-related 
expenditure and. the decrease in interest payments" determined by the reduction in the debt 
to GDP level, is positive in five of  the six countries considered  .. In other words, in five 
countries measures should be taken to improve the primary balance over most of the 
period 1997-2030 (see Charts l6a-f).so 
In Belgium the adjustment is always positive with a peak. of  2.3 to 3.0 percentage points 
in the year 2030. In Italy it is positive up to the year 1999 and after the year 2015 {in the 
worst scenario) or the year 2026 (in the best scenario) with a peak in the 1.1  to 2.9 per 
cent  range  in  the  year  2040.  In  Germany  the  adjustment  is  also  always  positive, 
increasing up to  6  percentage points by the  year 2030.  In  Finland the adjustment is 
positive respectively from 2007 and 2016 in the worst and the best scenarios and reaches 
a peak of around 3.5 points by the year 2030. In Spain it is always positive in the worst 
scenario and it is positive before 2009 and after 2021  in the best scenario, with a peak in 
the 0.4 to 2.1 range by the year 2030. 
Only_ Sweden would be able to  relax ·its  fiscal_._policy,  since the adjustment is  almost 
always negative. The negative gap between the ·required primary balance and the trend 
primary deficit would increase over most of  the projection period, reaching 1.5/2.5 points 
in 20JO and 4.114.4 points in 2050. 
49 
50 
See Buti eta!. (1997). 
The adjustment estimated  for  the  period  1998-200 I  is  obviously affected  by  the  assumption  that over  the 
period the real interest rates on the public debt gradually converge to 4 per cent. 
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 5.1.5  Tax~gaps and  comparisons  of alternative  fiscal  policies· - The  adjustments 
required to implement the "close-to-balance" rule change over time, according to primary 
deficit  trend~. and interest expenditure dynamics. A  concise measure of the adjustment 
required for each country over the whole period considered is provided by the tax-gap, 
i.e. the change in ~e  tax to GDP ratio immediately required to reach by the end of the· 
projection period -the  debt to· GQP ratio that would be reached by implementing the 
"elose-to-balance" rule outlined in the Stability and Growth Pact.  st · 
Th~  tax-gap concept also allows comparison of  the adjustment required by the "close-to-
balance". rule with those required by alternative policies, such as for instance, keeping the 
debt to .  GDP ratio  by the_ end of the projection period at the present. level  (i.e.,  the 
"sustainable tax-gap'' a  Ia Blanchard)S2 or bringing  it to the 60 per cent level, as required. 
by the Maastricht debt criterium. 
Under the above;.mentioned assumptions on productivity growth, GDP growth, inflation 
and interest rates, the tax-gap allowing for the respect of  the "close-to-balance" rule over 
. the period 1996-2030, is the highest in Germany (3.1  points)  .. According to the different 
pension scenarios, it is in the 0.9 to 1.5 range in Belgium, in the 0 to  1.~ range in Finland 
and iii the 0.3 to 0.9 range in Spain (see Table 10). In Italy and Sweden the tax-gap is 
negative for both pension scenarios, -implyitig that, given spending trends and current 
revenues,  no  adjustment  is  needed  over the  whole of the  period. considered  for  the 
implementation of  the "close-to-balance" rule·. 
For all six countries, the ·"close-to-balance" rule obviously implies bigger adjustments 
than those required for keeping the debt to GDP. ratio at the end of  the projection period 
at  the  present  level.  For  the  four  less  indebted  countries  it  also  requires  bigger 
adjustments than those required for maintaining a level of  the debt below 60 per cent. For 
·Belgium and Italy .the  adjustments  required  by the  implementation of the "close.;,to-
balance" rule are slighly lower than those required to keep the debt below 60 per cent, 
implying that, even if  the rule is respected, the level of  the debt to GDP ratio would still 
not have_declined below 60 per cent by the year 2030. In Italy and Sweden all tax-gaps 
are negative, irrespective of  pension scenarios and fiscal policy objectiv~s, implying that 
current fiscal policies allow for the respect of  the debt sustainability, the 60 per cent debt 
criterium and the "close-to-balance" rule.  · 
5.2 Alternative scenarios 
5~2.1 Temporary expenditure and revenue items - The estimates presented in Section 
5.1  are based on the assumption that, under constant policies, revenues and age-unrelated 
expenditure items are  constant as ·a share to  GDP  at their  1997  level.  Therefore,  the 
51  The calculation of the tax-gap has been carried out on the basis of  the discrete formula used by Blanchard 
( 1990) adjusted in order to be used for a different level of required debt to GDP by the end of the projection 
period. Th~  formula used is (symbols refer to Annex A): 
't. = (~)  ho  ~b"(t+r-er"  +  t.(g+h).(I+r-er<·-l). 
- I+r-e  t-(t+r:-er·  . 
52  See Section 2.1.3. 
35 temporary nature of  some revenue arid expenditure items is not taken into _consideration. 
-This  section provides  some tentative  estimates of the  effects· of ~e  ·removal ·of this 
assumption~ Two eases are considered: the expenditure. related to German reunification 
and the one-off  revenues included in the 1997 Italian budget.  ·. · ' 
.  ' 
Public expenditure related to  German reunification has been estimated by the German. 
·Ministry ofFinance.(l996) a8 4 to 5per cent of West German· GOP. If  the reduction of 
the burden f9r reunification would allow German. public expenditure to decline by, say, 
0.2 per cent of  GOP per year over a 15 year period, the expected primary balance trend 
would change radically: rather than worsening continuously, it would improve for  15 
years and worsen thereafter (see Chart 17).  Accordingly, the debt to GI;>P  ratio would 
increase substantially  only after the year.2020.  ·  · 
The adjustment to .  be implemented in the primary balance would also be substantially 
smaller than in the scenario assuming a constant expenditure to. GOP ratio; While itl the 
latter scenario the tax-gap allowing' for the implementation of  the "close-to-balance" rule 
is 3.1 per cent, in the scenario including reduction of  the burden for reunification the tax-
gap i~.  only 1 per cent. 
The 1997 Italian budget includes revenues of a temporary nature amounting to about 1.5 
per cen.t·of GOP. The exclusion of  these revenues from 1998 onwards would reduce the 
primary surplus and modify. the debt· dynamics in the unchanged policy scenario. The 
debt to GOP ratio would  decl~e up to the year 2010 and then· gradually in~rease; by the 
year 2030 it would be in the 120 to 133 range (see Chart 18). 
The adjustment required by the implementation of the "close-to-balance": rule would be 
substantially increased. Over the whole projection period, the unchanged policy primary 
surplus would be smaller than that required by the rule. The tax-gap would be in the l to 
1.2  range~ as against the negative values indicated in the estimates including temporary-
tax revenues.  .  ' 
5.2.2 Different macroeconomic scenarios: sensitivity analysis - As already mentioned, 
the  results  presented  in  the  previous  sections  are  based  on  primary  expenditure 
projections and macroeconomic assumptions. As to the latter, it has been assumed that, 
for all the countries considered, productivity per worker increases by  1.5  per. cent per 
year, GOP growth depends on productivity growth and the rate of  change in the number 
of working age citizens.  It is  also  assumed that inflation and the real  interest rate on 
public debt are respectively 2 and 4 per cent over the whole projection period  . 
. The  long-term  economic  outlook  is  obviously  very  uncertain.  In order to  as.sess  the 
implications of alternative economic scenarios on the. adjustments required by "close-to-
balance" rule, sensitivity analyses have been carried out by taking different values for the 
interest and  productivity  growth  rates.  More  specifically,  as  to  the  interest  rate,  two 
alternative scenarios have been considered: a more favourable one where the real interest 
rate  on the  public  debt  would  be  0.5  percentage  point ·smaller than  in  the  baseline 
scenario and a more unfavourable one, where it would be 0.5 percentage point higher. As 
to  the productivity rate,  an alternative scenario has  been examined assuming a yearly 
.  . 
growth rate  of 2  per cent as  agai~st the  1.5  per  cent yearly  growth assumed  in the 
baseline scenario. 
36 Table 10 
Tax-ga~  com~uted  over the ~e~iod 1997-2030 alloWing .for the resEectof: 
"Close to balance" rule  .60 ·per cent debt criterium  Sustainable public debt 
Favourable pension  Unfavourable  ·  Favourable pension  Unfavourable  Favourable pension  UnfavourabJe 
scenario  pension scenario  scenario  pension scenario  scenario  pension scenario 
Belgium  0.9  1.5  0.9  1.6  -0.3  0.3 
Finland  0.0  1.2  -0.5.  0.7  .-0.4  0.8 
.  \. 
Germany  3.1  2.8  2.8 
Italy  . -0.5  -0.3  -0.4  -0.2  -1.5  -1.'3 
Spain  0.3  ·0.9  -0.1  0.6  -0.2  0.4 
Sweden  -1.6  -0.5.  -1.9'  -0.8  -2.2  -1.2 3 
2 
~ 
Chart 17 
Adjustment in primary balances required for the implementation 
of  the "close .to balance" rule in Germany: 
tentative evaluation of  the reduction in the burden· for reunification. 
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Adjustment in prima·ry b,ala~ces  re9uir~d for the i~plementatif:?.n 
of  the "close-to-~alance" rule in I~ly: 
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l
a
n
c
e
f
 
f
 
r
u
l
e
B
a
s
e
-
y
e
a
r
:
1
9
9
6
B
a
s
e
-
v
e
a
r
:
1
9
9
7
F
a
v
o
u
r
a
b
l
e
 
p
e
n
s
i
o
n
 
U
n
f
a
v
o
u
r
a
b
l
e
 
p
e
n
s
i
o
n
 
F
a
v
o
u
r
a
b
l
e
 
p
e
n
s
i
o
n
 
U
n
f
a
v
o
u
r
a
b
l
e
 
p
e
n
s
i
o
n
s
c
e
n
a
r
r
o
s
c
e
n
a
n
o
s
c
e
n
e
n
o
s
c
e
n
a
n
o
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
I
t
a
l
y
S
p
a
i
n
 
,
S
w
e
d
e
n
1
,
0
0
,
4
3
,
9
2
,
0
1
,
7
-
r
,
2
1
,
7
1
,
9
1
1
2
,
4
0
,
1
0
,
9
0
,
0
3
,
1
-
0
,
5
0
,
3
-
1
,
6
1
,
5
1
,
2
-
0
,
3
0
,
9
-
0
,
5
l
b
dT
h
e
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
o
f
 
b
o
t
h
 
a
n
a
l
y
s
e
s
 
a
r
~
{
e
x
p
r
e
s
s
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
e
r
m
s
 
o
f
 
t
a
x
-
g
a
p
s
.
 
A
s
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
.
 
o
f
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
·
 
r
a
t
i
s
~
 
o
b
v
i
o
u
s
l
y
,
 
f
o
r
 
a
l
l
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
e
d
,
 
t
h
e
 
l
o
w
e
r
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
r
a
t
e
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
a
l
l
o
w
 
s
~
~
l
e
r
 
t
a
x
-
g
a
p
s
,
 
w
h
i
l
e
 
t
l
i
e
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
r
a
t
e
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
i
m
p
l
y
 
l
a
r
g
e
r
 
o
n
e
s
·
 
(
s
e
e
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
1
.
1
)
.
 
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
 
a
n
d
 
I
t
a
l
y
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
h
a
v
e
 
t
h
e
 
b
i
g
g
e
s
t
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
,
 
W
i
t
h
 
a
'
t
a
x
-
g
a
p
 
0
.
4
-
0
.
5
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
s
m
a
l
l
e
r
 
i
n
.
t
h
e
 
m
o
r
e
 
f
a
v
o
u
r
a
b
l
e
 
s
c
.
e
n
a
r
i
o
 
a
n
d
.
0
.
4
-
0
.
5
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
b
i
g
g
e
r
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
m
o
r
e
 
u
n
f
a
v
o
u
r
a
b
l
e
 
o
n
e
.
 
I
n
 
S
p
a
i
n
 
a
n
d
 
S
w
e
d
e
n
,
 
t
h
e
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
t
a
x
-
g
a
p
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
b
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
 
s
c
e
n
a
r
i
o
 
r
u
:
;
t
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
a
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
 
s
c
e
n
a
r
i
o
s
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
a
i
n
o
u
n
t
 
t
o
 
0
.
2
-
0
.
3
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
p
o
i
r
i
.
t
s
.
 
f
o
r
 
b
o
t
h
 
s
c
e
n
a
r
i
o
s
.
 
I
n
 
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
 
a
n
d
 
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
 
t
h
e
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
b
e
 
t
h
e
 
s
m
a
l
l
e
s
t
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
t
a
X
-
g
a
p
s
 
b
e
i
n
g
 
0
.
.
1
-
0
2
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
 
s
m
a
l
l
e
r
 
o
r
 
b
i
g
g
e
r
.
 
A
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
 
·
w
o
u
l
d
 
a
l
l
o
w
 
a
l
l
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
t
o
 
h
a
v
e
 
s
m
a
l
l
e
r
 
t
a
x
-
g
a
p
s
 
(
s
e
e
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
1
2
)
.
 
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
 
a
n
d
 
I
t
a
l
y
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
a
g
a
i
n
 
s
h
o
w
 
t
h
e
 
b
i
g
g
e
s
t
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
 
(
0
.
3
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
)
.
 
I
n
 
t
h
e
 
o
t
h
e
r
·
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
,
 
t
h
e
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
·
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
t
a
x
-
g
a
p
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
b
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
 
s
c
e
n
a
r
i
o
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
o
s
e
.
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
a
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
 
s
c
e
n
a
r
i
~
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
a
m
o
~
t
 
t
o
 
0
.
1
-
0
.
2
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
~
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
.
 
'
.
 
'
5
.
2
.
3
 
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
 
b
u
d
g
e
t
a
r
y
 
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
:
 
1
9
9
6
 
v
e
r
s
'
!
s
 
1
9
9
7
 
-
T
h
e
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
 
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
r
e
f
e
r
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
t
e
s
t
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
C
o
m
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
e
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
·
 
y
e
a
r
 
1
9
9
7
.
 
I
n
 
o
r
d
e
r
 
t
o
 
h
i
g
h
l
i
g
h
t
 
t
h
e
 
s
e
n
s
i
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
·
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
t
o
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
.
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
b
a
s
e
 
y
e
a
r
 
p
r
i
m
a
r
y
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
.
 
a
n
d
 
d
e
b
t
 
t
o
 
G
D
P
 
r
a
t
i
o
,
 
t
h
e
 
a
d
j
u
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
 
t
o
 
i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
 
t
h
e
 
"
c
l
o
s
e
-
t
o
-
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
"
 
r
u
l
e
 
h
a
v
e
 
a
l
s
o
 
b
e
e
n
 
e
~
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
b
a
s
i
s
 
o
f
 
1
9
9
6
 
p
r
i
m
a
r
y
 
b
_
a
l
a
n
c
e
s
 
·
 
a
n
d
 
d
e
b
t
s
.
 
O
n
 
t
h
e
 
w
h
o
l
e
,
 
1
9
9
6
 
d
e
f
i
c
i
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
q
e
b
t
s
 
a
r
e
 
w
o
r
s
e
 
t
h
a
n
 
t
h
o
s
e
 
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
1
9
9
7
.
 
T
h
e
 
1
9
9
6
 
p
r
i
m
a
r
y
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
i
s
 
e
q
u
a
l
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
t
h
a
t
 
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
1
9
9
7
 
f
o
r
 
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
 
a
n
d
 
w
~
r
s
e
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
1
9
9
6
 
d
e
b
t
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
i
s
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
f
o
r
 
f
o
u
r
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
(
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
,
 
I
t
a
l
y
,
 
S
p
a
i
n
 
a
n
d
 
S
w
e
d
e
n
)
 
a
n
d
 
s
l
i
g
h
t
l
y
 
l
o
w
e
r
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
t
w
o
.
 
A
s
 
a
 
c
o
n
s
e
q
u
e
n
c
e
,
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
s
i
x
 
c
o
u
n
t
d
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
a
d
j
u
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
 
.
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
"
c
l
o
s
e
-
t
o
-
:
-
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
"
 
r
u
l
e
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
b
a
s
i
s
 
o
f
 
1
9
9
6
 
d
a
t
a
 
i
s
 
s
u
b
s
t
a
n
t
i
a
l
l
y
 
h
l
g
h
e
r
 
t
h
a
n
 
t
h
a
t
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
b
a
s
i
s
 
o
f
 
1
9
9
7
 
d
a
t
a
 
(
s
e
e
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
1
3
)
.
 
-
T
h
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
s
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
u
l
a
r
l
y
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
f
o
r
 
I
t
a
l
y
 
a
n
d
 
S
p
a
i
n
.
 
5
.
 
3
 
D
e
b
t
 
r
e
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
a
g
e
i
n
g
 
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
 
T
h
e
 
"
c
l
o
s
e
-
t
o
-
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
"
 
r
u
l
e
 
h
a
s
 
b
e
e
n
 
p
r
i
m
a
r
i
l
y
 
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
a
v
o
i
d
i
n
g
 
b
u
d
g
e
t
a
r
y
 
i
m
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
s
 
i
n
 
m
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
 
u
n
i
o
n
.
 
S
o
l
i
d
 
b
u
d
g
e
t
a
r
y
 
d
i
s
c
i
p
l
i
n
e
 
i
s
 
a
n
 
e
s
s
e
n
t
i
a
l
 
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
s
u
c
c
e
s
s
 
o
f
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
a
n
d
 
M
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
 
U
n
i
o
n
 
(
E
M
U
)
.
 
A
 
s
o
u
n
d
 
b
u
d
g
e
t
a
r
y
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
b
e
f
o
r
e
 
j
o
i
n
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
·
 
a
n
d
 
b
u
d
g
e
t
a
r
y
 
p
r
u
d
e
n
c
e
 
o
n
c
e
 
i
n
 
(
E
M
U
)
 
a
r
e
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
b
u
d
g
e
t
a
r
y
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
 
p
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
M
a
a
s
t
r
i
c
h
t
 
T
r
e
a
t
y
.
 
T
h
e
·
 
i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
"
c
l
o
s
e
-
t
o
-
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
"
 
r
u
l
e
 
w
i
l
l
 
a
l
s
o
 
h
a
v
e
 
i
m
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
w
a
y
·
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
s
 
w
i
l
l
 
m
e
e
t
 
t
h
e
 
w
o
r
s
e
n
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
m
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
 
s
i
t
u
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
y
e
a
r
 
2
0
1
0
 
(
w
h
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
b
a
b
y
-
b
o
o
m
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
l
l
 
r
e
t
i
r
e
)
.
 
B
y
 
i
n
d
u
c
i
n
g
 
a
 
f
a
s
t
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
b
t
 
t
o
 
G
D
P
 
r
a
t
i
o
,
 
i
t
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
m
o
v
e
 
b
u
d
g
e
t
s
 
t
o
 
a
 
s
o
u
n
d
e
r
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
.
 
A
n
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
·
 
t
h
i
s
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
i
s
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
C
h
a
r
t
s
 
1
9
a
-
f
,
 
t
h
a
t
 
c
o
m
p
a
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
i
m
a
r
y
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
s
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
e
n
s
u
r
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
b
t
 
t
o
 
G
D
P
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
o
s
e
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
"
c
l
o
s
e
-
t
o
-
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
"
 
r
u
l
e
.
 
F
o
r
 
a
l
l
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
e
d
,
 
d
e
b
t
 
s
t
a
b
i
l
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
 
l
o
w
e
r
 
s
u
r
p
l
u
s
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
u
p
 
t
o
 
3
7
 2
0
1
0
-
2
0
2
0
 
a
n
d
 
h
i
g
h
,
e
r
 
s
u
r
p
l
u
s
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
.
 
T
h
e
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
t
w
o
 
s
c
e
n
a
r
i
o
s
 
a
r
e
 
p
a
t
1
i
c
u
l
a
r
l
y
 
r
e
l
e
v
a
.
r
l
t
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
h
i
g
h
l
y
 
i
n
d
e
b
t
e
d
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
.
 
.
:
 
T
h
i
s
 
i
i
n
p
l
i
e
s
 
·
 
:
·
t
h
a
t
 
.
 
t
h
e
·
 
"
c
l
o
s
e
-
t
o
-
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
"
 
n
i
l
e
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
s
m
o
o
t
h
.
 
t
h
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
 
b
u
d
g
e
t
a
r
y
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
 
a
s
 
·
c
o
m
p
a
r
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
s
c
e
n
a
r
i
o
 
i
n
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
a
d
j
u
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
 
a
r
e
·
d
e
l
a
y
e
d
 
t
o
·
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
i
n
.
w
h
i
c
h
 
a
g
e
i
n
g
 
w
i
l
l
 
b
e
 
m
o
r
e
 
a
c
c
e
n
t
u
a
t
e
d
.
 
M
o
r
e
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
l
l
y
,
 
t
h
e
 
r
u
l
e
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
a
t
l
o
w
.
 
M
e
m
b
e
r
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
·
 
t
o
 
o
f
f
s
e
t
 
p
a
r
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
l
i
k
e
l
y
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
 
i
n
 
p
e
n
s
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
 
~
:
?
C
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
r
e
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
i
n
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
.
 
A
b
o
u
t
 
h
a
l
f
 
o
f
'
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
e
d
 
b
y
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
g
e
_
i
n
g
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
t
W
o
 
h
e
a
v
i
l
y
 
i
n
d
e
b
t
e
d
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
t
a
k
e
n
 
i
n
t
o
 
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
b
e
 
o
f
f
s
e
t
 
b
y
 
r
e
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
i
n
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
.
 
I
n
 
c
o
n
c
l
u
s
i
o
n
,
 
t
h
e
 
i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
"
c
l
o
s
e
-
t
o
-
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
'
'
 
r
u
l
e
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
f
o
r
c
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
s
 
t
o
 
m
a
k
e
 
u
s
e
 
o
f
t
h
e
 
"
b
r
e
a
t
h
i
n
g
-
s
p
a
c
e
"
 
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
 
o
v
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
n
e
x
t
 
d
e
c
a
d
e
 
t
o
 
m
e
e
t
 
t
h
e
 
a
g
e
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
"
b
a
b
y
-
b
o
o
m
"
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
a
 
s
o
u
n
d
e
r
 
f
i
s
c
a
l
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
 
f
o
o
t
i
n
g
~
 
6
.
 
C
o
n
c
l
u
s
i
o
n
s
 
B
e
f
o
r
e
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
m
a
i
n
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
u
d
y
,
 
i
t
s
 
m
a
j
o
r
 
l
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
s
h
o
u
l
d
 
b
e
 
e
n
u
m
e
r
a
t
e
d
.
 
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
p
e
n
s
i
o
n
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
h
a
v
e
 
b
e
e
n
 
t
a
k
e
n
 
a
t
 
f
a
c
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
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n
d
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r
e
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o
t
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o
m
o
g
e
n
e
o
u
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
t
r
e
n
d
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
a
g
e
-
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
i
t
e
m
s
 
h
a
v
e
 
b
e
e
n
 
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
e
d
 
m
e
c
h
a
n
i
c
a
l
l
y
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p
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p
r
o
f
i
l
e
s
 
u
s
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
j
e
c
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b
e
 
s
t
r
e
s
s
e
d
 
t
h
a
t
 
d
e
m
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
 
f
a
c
t
o
r
s
 
a
f
f
e
c
t
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
b
u
d
g
e
t
s
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
s
e
v
e
r
a
l
 
c
o
m
p
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p
u
b
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p
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d
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t
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r
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r
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r
g
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p
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-
d
e
m
o
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c
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.
 
e
s
t
i
m
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t
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p
r
e
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h
i
s
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i
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c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
 
o
f
 
d
e
m
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
o
n
 
p
u
b
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p
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p
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p
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c
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a
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u
l
t
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T
h
e
 
m
a
i
n
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
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r
e
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
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.
 
a
)
 
C
i
t
i
z
e
n
s
 
o
f
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
 
s
e
x
 
a
n
d
 
a
g
e
-
g
r
o
u
p
s
 
c
o
n
s
u
m
e
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
 
a
m
o
u
n
t
s
 
o
f
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
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h
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y
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l
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r
e
c
e
i
v
e
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d
i
f
f
e
r
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n
t
 
a
m
o
u
n
t
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o
f
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
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r
a
n
s
f
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.
 
E
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
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o
r
 
·
 
.
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
,
 
p
e
n
s
i
o
n
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
c
h
i
l
d
 
a
l
l
o
w
a
n
c
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
b
u
d
g
e
t
 
i
t
e
m
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o
s
t
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
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n
 
t
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a
g
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s
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r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
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o
p
u
l
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t
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.
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h
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p
r
o
f
i
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f
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
 
e
x
p
e
n
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i
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r
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r
o
u
p
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f
 
t
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i
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o
u
n
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r
i
e
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n
s
i
d
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p
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p
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i
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p
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p
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p
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p
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.
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r
e
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r
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h
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3
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-
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o
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.
 
F
e
m
a
l
e
 
e
x
p
e
n
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i
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r
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
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r
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-
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o
w
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t
h
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n
 
m
a
l
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l
e
v
e
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.
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c
c
o
r
d
i
n
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t
o
 
s
t
u
d
i
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p
r
o
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u
c
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b
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n
a
t
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n
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i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
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v
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h
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u
b
l
i
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p
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x
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e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
t
o
 
G
D
P
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
b
y
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
4
.
5
 
t
o
 
5
 
·
.
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
o
f
 
G
D
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i
n
 
B
e
l
g
i
u
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2
.
5
 
t
o
 
4
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
i
n
 
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
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G
e
r
m
a
n
y
 
a
n
d
 
I
t
a
l
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5
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t
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p
o
i
n
t
s
 
i
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S
p
a
i
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a
n
d
 
S
w
e
d
e
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.
 
E
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
p
r
e
s
s
u
r
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
r
a
t
h
e
r
 
l
i
m
i
t
e
d
 
u
p
 
t
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t
h
e
 
y
e
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2
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.
 
T
h
e
 
o
u
t
l
o
o
k
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o
r
s
e
n
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
d
e
c
a
d
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
n
e
x
t
 
c
e
n
t
u
r
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a
n
d
 
d
e
t
e
r
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o
r
a
t
e
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e
v
e
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f
u
r
t
h
e
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f
t
e
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t
h
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y
e
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2
0
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h
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t
h
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b
a
b
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p
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generation retires. In several countries the effects of demographic trends  will be 
partly .  offset  by  reforms  already  introduced  aimed  at . restraining  expenditure 
. groWth.  ·  ·. 
c)  '  The integration of the estimates  of·  pension expenditure trends with mechanical . 
projections ·of the effects of demographic: ~hanges on the other main age-related 
expenditure items points to the following  increases in the share to GDP of  total 
primary expenditure over the period  1997..:2030: .  5".9  to  6.8  percentage points in 
Finland (according to different pension expenditure scenarios),-4~9 to 5.6 points in 
BelgiUlll, 3.8 to 5.0. points· "in  Italy, 5.4 points in Germany. In  Sweden the share 
would  remain nearly  constant  (-0.3. to  1.1  points).· This  implies  that  in  most 
countries the effects of ageing  on pension and health expenditure would not. be 
offset by the reduction in ·the demand for the public services and transfers directed 
to young citizens (e.du~ation, maternity and child allowances)~-
d)  · Under  the  a.Ss~ption that  .age-wirelated·  expenditure  items  and  revenues  are · 
constant as a share to GDP at the levels currently estimated for the year 1997, in 
.  Belgium, Finland, Germany,· Italy and Spam present primary surpluses would be 
gradually eroded by expenditure  increases~ Only Sweden would retain a primary 
surplus.  · 
Assuming for all countries that productivity per worker increases by  1.5  per cent 
per year, that GDP growth depends on productivity growth and the rate of  chang~ 
in the number of working age citizens, that inflation and the real interest rate on 
public debt are-respectively 2 and 4·per cent over the whole projection period and 
that the stock-flow adjustment is systematically zero, the debt to.ODP ratio (under 
urtchanged policies) would follow aU-shaped curve in B~lgium, Finland, Italy and 
Spain. It  would continuously increase in Germany,.while in Sweden the debt would 
decrease substantially and turn into a net credit position. 
e)  · According to ·the  Stability arid  Growth Pact  approved  at the  Dublin summit of 
December  1996,  EMU  Members  should  set inedium-term  budgetary  targets  of 
close-to-balance or in surplus  .. These targets would allow them to respect the 3 per 
cent ·ceiling  even  during  economic  downturns.  Taking  the  likely  effects  of 
downturns into consideration, the average deficit over the cycle may be of  the order 
of 1 per cerit ofGDP. 
Assuming that the· deficit is  fixed at  1 per cent from the year 1998  onwards and 
taking interest payments into account, it is possible to derive the primary balance 
level  required  by  the  "close-to-balance"  rule.  In  the  four  non-heavily  indebted 
countries the required primary surplus would decline from an initial value of 3 to 5 
per cent of GDP to  1 to 2 per cent ·by the year 2030. In the two heavily indebted 
countries it would decline from 6.5 to 8 per cent to 2.5 to 3 .per cent of GDP. The 
reduction  is  determined  by  the  decline  in  interest payments  related  to  the fast 
contraction in the level of  the debt to GDP ratio. 
The difference between the required primary balance and the trend primary balance 
provides an indicative measure of  the adjustment required by the implementation of 
the "close-to-balance" rule.  The  adjustment,  which  reflects  the  changes  in  age-
related expenditure,  is  positive  in  five  of the  six countries  considered.  In  other 
words, in five countries measures should be taken to improve the primary balance 
over most of the period 1997-2030 .. Only Sweden would appear to be able to relax 
its fiscal policy, since the adjustment is  negative .in most of the period taken into 
consideration. 
39 f)  Some expendiwre and, revenue items are of a temporary nature and :sh~Uld not be 
kept constant over the whole. projection period. The public .~xpenditure .related to 
German· reunification and the one-off tax measl.Jres  included in the  1991 Italian 
budget.  ~e  nyo ofth~  m~st  re~evant cases. Tentative estimates. assuming ~ gradual , 
··  reduction of  the burden  for. reUnification (3 ~per  :cent of  GDP. ove~ a ·15 year period) 
point to a substantial reduction of  the fiscal adjustment required in Germany for the 
.. i.mplementation of  th~ "close-to-balance" rule. Estimates excludfug from the Italian . 
unchanged policy scenario temporary tax revenues a.nlounting to 1.5  per cent of . 
GDP poitit to the n~ed of implementing fiscai  adjustment over' the whole period 
taken into consideration. · 
g)  The achievement ·of a. "close-to-balance" budget over the next few years w6uld 
allow Member _States.to meet the worsening__ofthe demographic situation after·the 
year 2010 (when the paby-boom generati<?n will retire) witli smaller public debts. 
This would allow them to offset part .of the likely increases.· in pension and health 
expenditure with reductio11-s  in interest payments.  About half of the  increase  in 
public expenditure de_termined  by. population ageing in the two heavily indebted 
countries  ~en  .  into  consideration  ~rould  · be  offset  by  reductions  in  interest 
payments 
The  "close-to-balance"  rule  would  force  government~  to·  make  use  of  the 
"breathing-space"-avB.ilable over the next decade to meet the ageing <?f tlie "baby-
boom" generation on a sounder fiscal  policy  footmg~ This ·:would  allow them to 
smooth the changes to be implemented. in present budgetary policy as compared 
· with the scenario in which adjustments are delayed to the peri<;>d  iri which ageing 
will be more accentuated. 
h)  Lower (higher) interest rates on public debt would obviously reduce (increase) the 
dimension· of the  adjustment  required  for  the  primary  balance.  For instance,. a 
reduction of about 0.5 percentage points would reduce the adjustment required for 
the year 2030 by 0.3  to  0.4 .percentage points of GDP  for the heavily indebted 
countries and by 0.2 points for the other countries. 
6.2 Further work . 
As already pointed out,  several  aspects. of the  study  need  substantial refinement  and 
improvement. The followh1g points are among the most relevant. 
.  . 
a)  Data concerning public expenditure for  differe.nt  age~groups should be updated. 
The same expenditure programmes should be considered for the· different Member 
States. If  possible, other Member States should be included~ 
b)  The  results  of long-term  projections  for,  non-pension  pub  lie expenditure  items 
carried  out  by ·national  institutions  should  be  compared  with  the  mechanical 
projections  and,· if possible,  integrated  in  the  projections.  This  may  allow  the 
impact of some relevant non-demographic factors  to be taken into consideration 
(e.g., long-term trends in health expenditure).  · 
c)  The baseline scenario ·should  include  the  likely  decline  over time  of the  main 
expenditru:e and revenue items of  a temporary nature. 
d)  As already mentioned, labour force participation rates and_ unemployment rates are 
at present assumed constant over the projection period, as well as age-related per 
capita expenditure for unemployment benefits. Alternative assumptions envisaging 
40 a reduction in unemployment rates and unemployment benefit expenditure should . 
be taken into consideration.  ·  -
e)  The assumptions for interest rates and productivity and employment groWth in the 
Member States could be differentiated.  · 
t)  The average deficit over the economic cycle consistent with the "close-to-balance" 
rule and assumed· as a reference for evaluating the adjustment to. be carried out on 
the primary balance, which at present is fixed at 1 per cent for all countries, could· 
be differentiated according to the dimension of the output swings and that of the. 
a~tomatic stabilisers. These factors would affect the deficit level to be acquired in 
non-recession years in order to avoid sanctions. 
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10 November." · Annex A:  The ''tax-gap" 
In order to construct an indicator of budget·  sustairtabi~lty, the frrst step .  is to define the 
primary deficit d such as:  · 
d = g+h--i 
where g is government spending on good arid services, h government tra.nSfers and t taxes 
all expressed in terms of  ratios to GDP.  . 
the change in the ratio of  public debt (b) to GDP, is then expressed by 
db = g +. h - t + (r -e  )b = d + (r -e  )b 
ds 
where r is the real interestrate and 9 the real-GDP growth rate. 
The public debt to GDP ratio in the year·n can.be expressed as the debt to GDP ratio in 
the initial year b0 accumulated at a rate equal to the difference between the interest rater 
and the growth rate e,  plus  the accumulated value,· at the  same rate,  of the  primary 
deficits along the way:  ·  · 
By discounting to time zero, the equation becomes: 
By substitution of  ds with (g +h -t)s, the equation becomes: 
which is equivalent to: 
Assuming that the tax rate. t = ts  is constant over time; the equation becomes: 
It is now possible to solve the integral in the left side of  the equation 
49 .. r  e  -(r~  )s ds = [  . l  .  e~(/~;J· •  =  -(r -et  (e -(r~  )n' -1) 
-(r -e) ·.  ·  .  .  .  0 
The equation becomes thus,: 
By isolating the· tax t ,  we obtain: 
which is equivalent to: 
- . .  .  . 
Let define t  as the sustainable_ tax rate t  that allows for the debt to _GDP ratio at the end 
of the projection period n to be equal at the initial level of the debt (b0 =  bn);  then the 
equation becomes: 
which is equivalent to: 
The sustainable tax rate is thus expressed as follows: 
The sustainable ta.X rate t • Is thus equal to the annuity value of future  ~xpected spending 
and transfers, plus the difference between the ex ante interest rate and the groWth rate 
times the ratio of debt to GDP. If the sustainable tax rate is greater than the current tax 
rate, t,  then sooner or later taxes will have to  be increased, and/or spending decreased. 
This latter indicator may be defined as the tax-gap and it is given by t '\- t. 
50 Annex B:  EU demographic prospects 
chang~s in birth rf.,ltes,  life expectancy and migration flows are modifying the level and 
structure  of the  population  of the  European  Union.  In recent .  years  national  anq 
international institutions have carried out several long-term projections of population. 
Forecasts for all countries were released in 1994 by the World Bank (see Bos. et al.). · 
Forecasts for the European Union Member States were produced in 1991  and 1996 by 
EUROSTAT. This paper is based on the latter projections.5~ 
Long-term demographic projections  are  however quite  uncertain.54  Fertility rates  can 
fluctuate considerably and rather unpredictably even in the short-term.  55  Mortality rates, 
although the margins of error are relatively smaller, are also difficult to predict.  56  Even : · 
greater uncertainties stem from the projection of net migration flows, which depend on 
several economic and· social factors,  on political decisions and on ·the enforcement of 
policies.  57  The uncertainty· of long-term projections is  stressed· in Danish Ministry of 
Finance ( 1995) that provides the following example: by· assuming a higher birth~rate and 
higher  net  immigration, · Denmark's . Statistical  Department,  in  its  ·1994  projection, 
estimated a  population of  .five. million people for  the year 2025,  as  against the four. 
million estimate projected a decade earlier. 
In order to take the uncertainty of  the .demographic outlook into account, this paper refers 
to three of  the five different scenarios developed by EUROSTAT in 1996: the 'baseline' . 
scenario, the 'youngest population' scen~o  and the 'most-aged population' scenario. 
Baseline 
Fertility rates are assumed to increase in low fertility countries and remain nearly stable in 
other countries (in. the year 2035 total fertility rates in the 15 countries are in  the 1.5-1.  9 
range),  life expectancy at birth  is· projected to  increase by  5.5-7.7 years  in  the  different 
countries for males and 4.3-6.2 years for females  in  the  period  up to 2050,  an ·inflow of 
600,000 persons per year for the Union is projected up to 2010 (see Table 81 ). 
Youngest population 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
Fertility. rates are assumed to increase in all countries (with total fertility rates in the 1.8-2.1 
range in the year 2035), life expectancy at birth is projected to increase by 2.0-3.2 years for 
males and 1.6-2.8 years for females in the period up to 2050, net migration is relatively high 
(an inflow of 800,000 persons per year up to 201 0). 
See Eding (1995)  and  the  papers  presented  at the  seminar New  Long-Term  Population  Scenarios for the 
European &anomie Area- EUROSTAT- European Commission- Luxembourg, 1995. 
Long  (1995)  and  Rogers  (1995)  evaluate  the  methodological  problems  underlying  long-term  population 
projections. Long also analyses the accuracy of  official population projections used for government planning. 
In the early nineties,.for instance, the number of  births in.the European Union was lower than that predicted by 
Eurostat in 1991  in the low-fertility scenario. See DeJong (1995) and Crujsen and Eding (1995). According to 
the latter paper (p. 4), "fertility showed .once again its capricious and unpredictable nature". 
,See Van Hoorn and De Beer (  1995) and Crujsen and Eding ( 1995). · 
The topic is examined in Visser (1995). 
51 Most-aged population 
Fertility rates decline in most countries (with total fertility rates in  the 1.3-1.6 range in the 
year 2035), life e?<pectancy  increases  byS.5~11.4 years for males. and  6.7~8.2 years for 
females in the period up to 2050, net migration is relatively low (400~000 persons per year 
up to· the year 201 0). 
In the baseline  s~enario, total EU population increases from  371.6 million 'in 1995  to 
388.0 million in 2025, declining thereafter to '367.0  million in 2050.  In the least-aged 
scenario, total EU population .increases up to the year 2044 (to 414.3 ·million) and remain · 
nearly  constant  afterwards  (413.6 -million  in 2050).  In· the- most-aged  scenario,  total 
population reaches a peak in 2010 (378.6 million) and thereafter declines to 331.6 milfion· 
in.2050.  .  ·· 
A significant .ageing of EU population occurs  under all  scenarios  ..  The change in the 
population structure is clearly shoWn in the population pyramids that.refer to the baseline 
scenario (Charts B1a-c).· In this·scenario the ratio of  the citizens aged 65 and over to total 
population increases from  15.4 per cent in 1995  to 27.3 per cent in 2040 and remains 
stable thereafter. 
The ratio. of  the elderly to working age population, which provides a _frrst measure of  the 
burden  represented  by .  the former  group,  increases  even  more  subs~tially:  .. in  the 
·baselin~ scenario it rises from 25.~ pet cent in 1995 to 38.1 per cent in 2025 and 51.4 in 
2040. In the 'youngest population' scenario it  reaches a peak at 41.4 per cent in 2040; in 
the 'most aged population' scenario it grows continuously to 65.1  per cent in 2050 (see 
Chart: B2a). This process affects all the countries taken into consideration in this study, 
with Italy and Spain reaching the highest ratios in all scenarios and Sweden recording the 
lowest ratios (see Chart B3a-,f). .  ·  · 
The  composition  of  the  elderly  and  working-age  population  will  also  change 
· substantially; both groups will gradually age (see Charts B1a-c). In the· baseline scenario, 
in the EU the ratio of  people aged 80 and over to people aged 65 and over increases from 
25.1 per-pent in 1995, to 27.2 per cent in 2025 and 36.3 in 2050. The ratio of  people aged 
50-64  to  people aged  15-64 increases -from  27.6  per. cent  in  1995  to  37.6  in 2025; 
thereafter it' declines to 34.9 in 2040. 
In the  baseline  scenario  the  ratio  of the  EU  citizens  aged  0  to  19  to  working  age 
population declines from  39.4 per cent in 1995  to  34.7 per cent' in 2025. Thereafter it 
rises up to 36.6 per cent by the year 2040.-In the youngest population scenario the ratio 
increases up to  a 44.0 per cent peak in 2040.  In the most-aged populatio'n scenario it 
declines to 30.0 per cent in 2025 and remains stable thereafter (see Chart B2b). Similar . 
trends are expected for all the six countries taken into consideration, wlth Italy and Spain 
recording the lowest levels and Finland and Sweden recording the highest ones (see Chart 
B4a-f). 
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C.l Belgium - The  .·expenditure profiles for Belgium are based on the estimates provided 
by Lambrecht et al  . .(1994).58 The aggregate 1988 values (or the main social expenditure 
·items have been allocated by 5-year age classes (0-4 to 95-99 years)  .. These data have 
been used to compute .the average per capita expenditure in Belgian francs for each age-
group in the year  1988.  The following items were considered: ·health care,  invalidity 
benefits,  59 education, pensions·(for both the'public and the ~rivate sector), ¢1empioyment 
benefits,  60 family allowances,. maternity benefits· and expenditure for nursery schools. 
In 1988, the programs considered by Lambrecht et a!.  accounted for. about_ 62 per cent of 
general government expenditure net of  interest payments and represented 28.8 per cent of 
GDP.61  . 
The per capita expenditures reported in Lamorecht et al.  have been expressed in terms of 
per capita 1988 GDP~ Chart Cl outlines the resulting age.,.related profiles. The total age-
related  expenditure· profile  has  two  peaks  for  the  15-19  and the 70-74 age-groups. 
Educational  expenditUre  largely  contribute  s  in  determining  the  increase  in  total 
expenditure from the 0-4 to .the  15~  19  age~group. Expenditure then·. gradually declines, 
reaching a minimum level with the 30..;34 age-group. It remains· relatively low up to the 
45-49  age-group.  Thereafter  it increases  .. fast,  because of .the  substantial  increase  in 
· disability and unemployment .benefits (in the 50-64 age range) and in pensions (which 
become the  most relevant expenditure  item from  the .60-64  age-group).  Expenditure 
peaks in the 70-74 group and declines afterwards. 
C.2 Finland - The age expenditure profiles for Finland have been estimated in Maki ·  et 
al.  (1996). The aggregate 1993 values for the main social  ~xpenditure items have been 
allocated by age classes (0 to ·108  years).  These data have been used. to compute the 
average per capita expenditure in Finnish markka for each age-group in the year 1993. 
General Government payments, net of interest payments, have been broken down· into 
spending on 11  age-related items (health, education, pensions, social services, transfers 
related · to  children,  unemployment  benefits,  other  social  transfers,  transfers  to 
households,  transfers  to  non-profit  organisations,  transfers  to  farmers  and  firms,  net 
investments) and on the remaining age-unrelated public consumption. The net investment 
profile is based on the profile for public consumption. 
58  The study updated and improved some estimates of the effects of demographic changes on public expenditure 
carried out in 1981 (see Lambrecht, 1981). 
59  These  include  benefits  for  temporary  work  disability,  invalidity,  work  accidents,  professional  diseases  and 
handicaps. 
60  Expenditure for unemployment also includes expenditure for early retirement pensions and active employment 
policies.  ·  . 
61  The total  amount of public  expenditure .  for  t~e items. considered  by  Lambrecht  et a/.  have  been  computed 
multiplying the age-related per capita amounts indicated by  Lambrecht et a/.  by  the number of people in each 
age-group resulting in EUROST  AT statistics.  · 
53 In 1993, the progr~s  considered by Maid eta!. (1996) accounted for about 78 .per cent · . 
·of  general govermrtent expenditure net of  interest payments and repr~sented 43..0 per cent 
· ofGDP.62 
· the per capita expenditlires reported in Maid et al.  haye been expressed in. terms of per 
capita 1993  GDP.  Chart C2 outlines the resUlting  age-related- profiles  .. The total age- ' 
related expenditure profile is {J-shaped. Transfers related to chiJdren and social services 
determine a high level of  expenditure for the 0-2 age group (over 50 per cent of  per capita 
GDP).  For· the  7-18  age-group  education  is  the  main  expenditure  item,  with: total 
expenditure amounting to about  40 per cent of  per capita GDP. Total expenditure remains 
high for the 20-25 group, for which unemployment benefits and other social transfers add 
up to the gradually declining education expenditure.· The lowest expenditure levels (20-
25 per cent of per capita GDP) are recorded for the 30-50 age-group. For the following 
generations expenditure gradually increases, reaching 55 per cent of per capita GDP for 
60 year old, 78 per cent for 65  year old,  95  per cent for 80  year old.  This profile. is · 
determined by the high level of  pension benefits (over 50 per cent of per capit GDP for 
all classes over 60) and by the rising level of  health and social services expenditUre .. 
C.3  Germany - The age  and sex· expenditure profiles  for  both  Western ·and Eastern 
Germany were utilised by Gokhale J., Raffelhiischen B. and Walliser J.  (1995). Most of· 
the data were obtained from the German SoCio-Economic Panel. The health expenditure 
. profile is a smoothed version of  data collected by Henke and Berhens (1989). 
Public expenditure profiles have been computed for the main age-related items: social 
security, health, accident insurance, unemployment insurance, .  general welfare, housing 
benefits,  maternity benefits and child benefits. ·The profiles are  presented in terms of 
indexes  (c~) based on the expenditure recorded for a 40 year old male in the base-year 
1992.  ' 
with  = (expenditure for budgetary item k per member of each age-group i in 
the base year  j  ) I (expenditure for budgetary item k per male of  the age-
group 40 in the base yearj);  · 
= expenditure for budgetary item k in national currency per male of  the 
age-group 40 in the base yearj. 
In 1992, the programs considered by Gokhale J. et al.  accounted for about 43  per cent of 
general government expenditure net of  interest payments and represented 19.5 per cent of 
GDP.63 
62  The total  amount of public expenditure  for  the  items  considered  by  Mati  et a!.  ( 1996)  have  been  computed 
multiplying the age-related per capita amounts indicated by Mati eta!. (1996) by the number of people in each 
age-group indicated in the same study. 
63  According to Gokhale eta/., the programs accounted for DM 725 billion. 
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 . ChartC3a. 
Age-related public expenditure profile in Wes·t~Germany  ~ Ma~es· . 
(percentage.  of  per capita GOP) 
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ChartC3d The profiles have be~n expressed in terms of  per capita 1992. GDP. Charts C3a and C3b 
.. ·outline  the  West-Germany  age-related  profiles ·of the  expendituTe  items  taken  into 
·._consideration.  Since ·educational expenditure is  not included,  the  profiles present only 
one peale E}{penditure  is· rather-limited- up_ to the  15 year class.  Thereafter it. increases 
because of  a rise in he~th  ·services,· unemployment and welfare benefits. Pension benefits 
affect males and females' expenditure profiles from the 50 year class; they peak in the 68-
75  group  for  males and  in the 70-85 group  for  females.  Accident  insur~ce  ·benefits 
substa.Iltially affect the males' profile in the 65-70 age-group. BecaU;se of differences in 
pension benefits, the males' profile is substan:tially hlgher than the female's one for the 
age-groups over 55.  · 
Charts C3c and C3d outline the profiles computed for former East-Germany. Because of 
higher unemployment benefits, males'  and· females'  expenditure levels  are "higher than 
those presented for West-Germany up to the 50 year class. Thereafter, because of lower 
pension expenditure; East-Gerrhany males' profile is substantially below Western levels. 
The females' profiles of the two areas are rather similar. Over the whole lifetime, .East-
Germany presents lower health expenditure arid higher housing benefits. 
C.4 Italy -The age and sex expenditure profile for Italy has been estimated in Franco et 
al.  (1994).  General Government .payments, net of interest payments, have been broken 
down into spending on five  age-related items  (health,  edueation,  pensions,  household 
l  ' 
responsibility payments and other social security transfers) and on the remaining age-
unrelated items. The aggregate 1990 values of  each of  these different payments have been 
allocated by age  (0  to  90  years  and over)  andsex according to cross  section age-sex. 
profiles. As for German public expenditur~, the profiles are presented in terms of  indexes 
with the index  1 representing the expenditure for  a 40 year old male in the base-year 
1990. 
In 1990, the age-related programs considered by Franco et al.  account~d for about 66 per 
cent of  general government expenditure net of  interest payments and repres~nted 27 A per 
centofGDP. 
Within  the  present  study,  the  data have  been  updated  on the  basis  of 1994  G~neral 
Government aggregate outlays (G!
994
)  and 1994 population (.?;
1994
). This means that the 
projection is based on the 1990 indexes of  relative expenditure for each age-group within 
each expenditure item (c:t
0
), but on the 1994 level of  the expenditure.64 In 1994 the age-
related programs considered by Franco et al.  accounted for about 65  per cent. of general 
government expenditure net of  interest payments and represented 28.3 per cent of  GDP. 
Charts C4a and C4b outline the age-related profile of the expenditure items taken into 
consideration expressed in terms of per capita 1994 GDP.  Both the males' and females' 
profiles  have  a  peak  for  the  10  year  old  age  class.  Educational  expenditure  largely 
contributes in determining the changes in total expenditure ·up to the 20-24 age classes. 
Expenditure  then  declines,  reaching  a  minimum  level  for  the  27-48  age  classes. 
Thereafter it  increas~s fast,  because of the substantial increase in pension expenditure. 
64  -r11994  .  't  71994  G
1994 
The value of v  40  has been computed as  V  40  =  ( .~  1994 ) 
L;  C;k  X P; 
55 Health expenditure also contributes to this trend;. The malesf profile peaks for the 65-70 
age classes, while the ~emales' profile is nearly flat after the 65 age c~a5s. 
- C.S Spain ..  The expenditure  p~ofiles for Spain are· based on the estimates provided· by 
.  Tejero and Moreno (1994). The average per capjta expenditure in Spanish Pesetas for 
three age classes (0 to  14,  15  to 64 and 65 and over) results from the allocation of  th,e 
aggr~gate 1991  values for the main social expenditure items over each  •. age-group. The 
following ·five  items ·were  considered:  health care,  pensions,  unemployment  benefits, 
family allowances, other social benefits. Different profiles were not computed for males 
and females.  · 
In 1991, the age-related programs considered by Tejero and Moreno accounted for about 
49 per cent of general government expenditure net of  inte~;est payments and represented 
about 20.3 per cent ofGDP.  , 
.  . 
The per capita expenditures reported in Tejero and Moreno have been expressed in terms 
of  per capita 19~  1 GDP. Chart C5 outlines the resulting age-related .Profiles. Expenditure 
increases from 5 per cent of-per capita GDP for the 0-14 age-group to 14 per cent for the 
15-64 group and to 73 per cent for the older age group. Pensions and health care account 
for most of  the changes in expenditure levels. 
C.6 Sweden - The age and sex expenditure pr~files have been estimated by  Hag~mann · 
""  and John (1995) according to the results of  an income and expenditure survey undertaken 
by the Swedish Statistical Office. The· sur-Yey  refers to  1992  .. Per capita expenditure in 
Swedish  kronor  have  been  .computed  for  20 · age-groups  (1 0  for  males  and  10  for 
females).  Only cash transfer have been considered. Profiles have been produced for the 
following items: pensions, labour market assistance, sickness benefits, social assistance, 
child  allowances,  parents  allowances,  educational  grants,  accident  allowances.  Child 
allowances are attributed to parents. ' 
The  1992 indexes of relative expenditure for  each age-group  within each expenditure . 
item (c:i
92
)  have been updated by the above mentioned economists ori the basis of an 
estimate of 1995 level of the expenditure. In 1995  the age-related programs considered 
by Hagemann and John represented 23.5 per cent ofGDP. 
Charts C6a and C6b outline the age-related profile of the expenditure  item~ taken ·into 
consideration  expressed  in  terms  of per  capita  1995  GDP.  As  already  pointed  out, 
'education and health expenditures are not included and child allowances are attributed to 
parents.  This  underestimates  public  expenditure  devoted  to  younger  age  groups.  The 
males'  and  females'  profiles  have  a peak for  the  20-30  year .age-groups,  with ·labour 
market assistance representing  the  major expenditure  item.  Expenditure then declines, 
reaching a minimum level  for  the  40-50 age  classes.  It increases substantially for  the 
over-60  age-groups.  Pensions  represent  the ·  only,  relevant  expenditure  item  for  these 
groups~ Both profiles peak for the 70-80 age classes, respectively at 80 per cent of per 
capita GDP for males and at 55 per cent for females.· 
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ChartC6a · Annex D:  The 'deinan~' for public expenditure 
· ·This Annex examines the changes in the. 'demand' for public expenditure determined by 
demographic ·changes  ooder, the  assumption  of constant  expenditure  profiles  for  the 
members of  each age-group (Le. index A).  · 
In the period 1995-2010 total age-related expenditure would increase by 16 .per cent in 
Germany and by 8 to  11  per cent· in the other five  countries taken into consideration. 
Substantial increments would be  recorded  over the following  15  years  in all  the  six 
countries. (see· Chart D1).  Thereafter it would  gradually  flattens  and decline  in most 
countries after the year 2035. Projected increases are lower for the countries for. which 
education  expenditure  is  Ween  into  consideration:  the  increase  in  total  age-related 
.expenditure  would  reach  25  per ·cent  in  Belgium,  Finland  ~d  Italy,  29  per cent. in . 
Sweden, 3  7 per cent in German and 40 per  cent.  65 
Pension expenditure trends, which contribute substantially to. expected increases· in total 
expenditure, are rather homogeneous (see Chart D2a).  By the year 2010 real pension 
expenditure would increase by 15 to ·18 per cent  in Belgium,.Italy, Spain and Sweden and 
by nearly 30 per cent in Finland and Germany. By the year 2035 it  would increase by 50-
55 per cent in Finland, Italy and Sweden and by 60-70 per cent in Belgium, Germany and 
Spain. 
Health expenditure trends are rather similar for Belgium, Italy, Germany and Spain, with 
expenditure increasing by about 15 per cent and peaking in the period 203q-2035 for the 
first three countries and ten years later in Spain.  Finnish expenditure trends are  quite 
different: real health .expenditure increases by ~early  40 per cent (see Chart D2b  ). 
Over the period 1995-2010 real education expenditure would decline by about  10  per 
cent in Italy and 3-4 per cent in Belgium and Finland. By the year· 203 5 the reduction 
would reach 27 per cent in Italy and 10 per cent in Belgium and Finland (see Chart D2c). 
The substantial  r~duction projected for Italy is related to its low projected fertility rate 
(1.5, as against 1.8 for Belgium and Finland) and to its higher present expenditure profile. 
65  It should  be  stressed  that  real  expenditure  trends  also  depend  on  the  evolution  of total  population.  The 
relatively small increases projected for Italy largely depend on the expected decline of  Italian population. 
57 1,8 
~ 1,7  II 
ll) 
0) 
0) 
~ 1,6 
)( 
Cl)· 
"C 
.5 
e 
1,5 
.a  :c  1,4 
C• 
Cl) 
a. 
)( 
1  .• 3  ·cu 
c 
~  0  ·u; 
1,2  c 
Cl) 
a. 
'iU 
1  '1  Cl) 
0::: 
1995 
1,4 
- 1,35  'jj 
ll) 
0) 
Ol  ' 
~  1,3 
)( 
Cl) 
"C 
.5  1,25 
e 
.a  1,2  :c  c 
Cl) 
a. 
)(  1,15  C1) 
.t:  .... 
'iU 
1 '1 
C1) 
.t: 
'iU 
C1) 
0:::  1,05 
1995 
1,05 
~ 
II 
ll) 
0) 
0)  0,95 
~ 
)( 
Cl) 
'C  0,9  .5  ....  :c  0,85  c 
Cl) 
a. 
)( 
C1)  0,8  tJ 
u 
:1 
"C  0,75. 
Cl) 
'iU 
Cl) 
0:::  0,7 
0,65. 
1995 
' 
2000 
Effects of demographic changes on pension 
expenditure ~ Baseline demographic scenario_  -. 
2005  2010  2015  2020  2025- 2030  2035  2040 
Effects of  demographic changes on he.alth 
expenditure - Baseline demographic scenario 
--._,..,.- ........  .. .. .  . 
..... 
.... :..::...-----
...;.-
..... - - Italy 
( 
Chart D2a 
2045.  2050 
ChartD2b 
2000  2005  2010  2015  2020  2025  2030  2035  2040  2045  2050 
ChartD2c. 
Effects of demographic changes on education 
expenditure - Baseline demographic scenario 
'· 
- - • - - - - • ___ • . • • • ..  • ..  Belgium  ....... ...... -...  , _____ ...... -- ......... , 
'  ......_ .... _  !taly  ------ ........... ...... 
2000  2005  2010  .  2015  2020  2025  2030  2035  2040  2045  2050 C
h
a
r
t
D
l
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
f
 
d
e
m
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
o
n
 
r
e
a
l
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
a
g
e
-
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
B
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
 
d
e
m
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
 
s
c
e
n
a
r
i
o
 
1
,
4
r
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
~
-
-
-
-
-
-
~
~
~
~
-
-
-
-
-
-
~
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
~
-
-
~
~
~
~
~
~
 
-
.
.
.
.
.
 
I
I
 
I
t
)
 
e
n
 
e
n
 
~
 
)
(
 
1
,
3
5
 
1
,
3
 
-
8
 
1
,
2
5
 
·
=
 
e
 
E
 
:
0
 
c
.
;
 
~
 
)
(
 
Q
)
 
-
~
 
:
0
 
:
:
:
s
 
a
.
 
'
0
 
s
 
n
s
 
1
,
2
 
-
e
 
1
,
1
5
 
Q
,
 
C
)
 
n
s
 
~
 
1
,
1
 
1
,
0
5
 
"
"
'
 
1
9
9
5
 
-
.
.
J
l
 
a
-
-
-
-
-
+
-
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
 
-
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
 
·
-
-
·
4
!
-
-
-
-
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
 
-
*
-
I
t
a
l
y
 
-
*
-
S
p
a
i
n
 
-
.
-
s
w
e
d
e
n
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
5
 
~
 
G
e
n
n
a
n
y
~
 
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
 
"
·
 
2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
5
 
2
0
2
0
 
2
0
2
5
 
2
0
3
0
 
2
0
3
5
 
.
 
2
0
4
0
 
2
0
4
5
 
2
0
5
0
.
 